

8000 SERIES TMR SYSTEM

SAFETY MANUAL

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PREFACE

This Manual contains the recommended Safety Requirements a System Integrator must consider and implement when designing and building a Safety System using the 8000 series range of products.

The contents of this Manual have been reviewed by TÜV and all recommendation and comments made by TÜV have been incorporated.

REVISION AND UPDATING POLICY

All new and revised information pertinent to this document shall be issued by ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. and shall be incorporated into this document in accordance with the enclosed instructions. The change is to be recorded on the Amendment Record of this document.

PRECAUTIONARY INFORMATION

WARNING

Warning notices call attention to the use of materials, processes, methods, procedures or limits which must be followed precisely to avoid personal injury or death.

CAUTION

Caution notices call attention to methods and procedures which must be followed to avoid damage to the equipment.

Notes:

Notes highlight procedures and contain information to assist the user in the understanding of the information contained in this document

WARNING

RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE

MOST ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IS INFLUENCED BY RADIO FREQUENCY INTERFERENCE (RFI). CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF PORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AROUND SUCH EQUIPMENT. SIGNS SHOULD BE POSTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE EQUIPMENT CAUTIONING AGAINST THE USE OF PORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE MUST BE PERFORMED ONLY BY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL. OTHERWISE PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH, OR DAMAGE TO THE SYSTEM MAY BE CAUSED.

CAUTION

STATIC SENSITIVE DEVICES

MODULES IN THE TMR SYSTEM MAY CONTAIN STATIC SENSITIVE DEVICES WHICH CAN BE DAMAGED BY INCORRECT HANDLING OF THE MODULE. THE PROCEDURE FOR MODULE REMOVAL IS DETAILED IN RELEVANT PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS AND MUST BE FOLLOWED. ALL TMR SYSTEMS MUST HAVE LABELS FITTED TO THE EXTERIOR SURFACE OF ALL CABINET DOORS CAUTIONING PERSONNEL TO OBSERVE ANTI-STATIC PRECAUTIONS WHEN TOUCHING MODULES. THESE PRECAUTIONS ARE DETAILED IN CHAPTER 3 OF THIS PACKAGE.

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

Issue Number	Changes
Issue 1	Initial Issue
Issue 2	Updated to reflect re-certification as of September, 2001
Issue 3	Updated to reflect 3.0 certification.
Issue 4	Updated to add new logo
Issue 5	Updated to correct table and figure numbering.
Issue 6	Updated to reflect 3.1 certification.
Issue 7	Updated to reflect 3.2 certification.
Issue 8	Updated to reflect EN 60204 stop categories. Reworded 3.5.1.2
Issue 9	Added IEC 61508, EN54, NFPA 85 and HFPA 86 requirements
Issue 10	Updated to reflect TUV comments
Issue 11	System release 3.3
Issue 12	Not released
Issue 13	Updated Section 3.12.11 For Intelligent Update
Issue 14	Added 3.7.1.6 & updated 3.22 System Release 3.4
Issue 15	<p style="text-align: center;">Added Appendix B – Triguard (SC300e) support</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Added Application and System Configuration archive to 3.12.1 and 3.12.2.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Added 8472 Output Module to Table 5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Reworded 2.2.1.10.3 & 3.2.4</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Removed item 4 from section 3.13.3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Corrected reference in 3.11.3 to specify section 5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Added “Grey Channel” to glossary</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Corrected 3.6.2 paragraph 2 to refer to the correct section.</p>

	<p>3.7.2 added 'companion slot' to a. and removed 'pair' from b.</p> <p>Previously unlabeled figures and tables given references and hence figure and table numbering changed</p>
<p>Issue 16</p>	<p>Updated to incorporate TUV comments to release 3.41,</p> <p>Record of amendments for issue 15 had incorrect table reference for 8472 Output module.</p> <p>Previously unlabeled figures and tables given references in issue 15 and hence figure and table numbering changed.</p> <p>Some points in checklist 4.2.1 were changed in error and have been corrected in issue 16</p>

ABBREVIATIONS

1-oo-2	One-out-of-two
1-oo-2D	One-out-of-two with diagnostics
2-oo-2	Two-out-of-two
2-oo-3	Two-out-of-three
API	Application Program Interface
DIN	Deutsche Industrie-Norm (German Industrial Standard)
DIU	Diagnostic Interface Utility
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
EUC	Equipment Under Control
FB	Function Block
FCR	Fault Containment Region
HIFT	Hardware Implemented Fault Tolerance
IL	Instruction List
I/O	Input/Output
IMB	Inter-module Bus
LD	Ladder Diagram
MMU	Memory Management Unit
MTR	Mean Time to Repair
PC	Personal Computer
PST	Process Safety Times
PSU	Power Supply Unit
SFC	Sequential Function Chart
SFOC	Second Fault Occurrence Time
SIL	Safety Integrity Levels
ST	Structured Text
TMR	Triple Modular Redundant
TÜV	Technischer Überwachungs-Verein
UPS	Uninterruptable Power Supply

GLOSSARY

Actuators	Devices which cause an action (electrical, mechanical, pneumatic, etc.) to occur when required within a plant component.
Architecture	Organisational structure of a computing system which describes the functional relationship between board level, device level and system level components.
ASCII	The American Standard Code for Information Interchange. Uses seven bits to represent 128 characters. Both upper and lower case letters, numbers, special symbols and a wide range of control codes are included.
Availability	The probability that a system will be able to perform its designated function when required for use – normally expressed as a percentage.
Asynchronous	A data communications term describing the method by which signals between computers are timed. Although the number of characters to be sent per second is undefined, the rate at which a character's bits are sent is pre-determined. Each character is preceded by a start bit and terminated by a stop bit.
Backplane	A printed circuit board which supports bussed functions to connectors mounted on a printed circuit board. Plug-in components and modules are then able to connect to the bus pins.
Buffer	A type of memory in which information is stored temporarily during transfer from one device to another, or one process to another. Normally used to accommodate the difference in the rate or time at which the devices can handle the data.
Bus	A group of conductors which carry related data. Micro-based systems have an Address Bus, Data Bus and a Control Bus.
Companion Slot	Spare (standby) slot position adjacent (to the right) to the slot occupied by the 'active' module. The slots are inter-connected to enable the 'active' module to be 'hot' replaced as necessary.
Controller	A Controller is the heart of any ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. microprocessor based system. It performs central processing of user application logic and controls the actions of input and output hardware, as well as peripheral hardware such as printers and Visual Display Units.

Discrepancy	A discrepancy exists if one or more of the elements disagree.
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory. A type of volatile read/write memory where the data is stored as a short-life capacitive charge. Though high density and low cost are a feature of DRAMs, they require each row address and hence all data to be refreshed frequently.
Element	A set of input conditioning, application processing and output conditioning.
Engineering Workstation	Comprising rugged PC platform fitted with IEC1131 TOOLSET.
EPROM	Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory. A non-volatile storage medium which is electronically programmed. The EPROM device may be erased by strong ultra-violet light.
EUC	Equipment Under Control. Equipment, machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical or other activities.
Fail Safe	The capability to go to a pre-determined safe state in the event of a specific malfunction.
Fault Tolerance	Built-in capability of a system to provide continued correct execution of its assigned function in the presence of a limited number of hardware and software faults.
Field Devices	Equipment connected to the field side of the I/O terminals. Such equipment includes field wiring, sensors, final control elements and those operator interface devices hard-wired to I/O terminals.
Firmware	Special purpose memory units containing software embedded in protected memory required for the operation of programmable electronics.
Fixed Frame	An empty fixed metal surround, designed to contain 483mm (19") standard equipment.
FBD	Functional Block Diagram. A graphical IEC1131 language for building complex procedures by taking existing Functional Blocks from the IEC1131 library and wiring them together on the screen.
Grey Channel	A non-safety critical communication line between two modules that are regarded as safety critical. Communications sent across a "grey channel" are viewed as subject to errors induced by that channel which must be detected and compensated by the safety related receiver.
GUI	Graphical User Interface

Hot Swap	Alternative term for Companion Slot
IEC 1131 TOOLSET	Software used to configure and program the 8000 series TMR system.
IEC 61508	IEC61508 is an international standard that covers functional safety, encompassing electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems; hardware and software aspects.
IEC 61511	IEC61511 is an international standard that covers functional safety and Safety Instrumented Systems for the process industry, encompassing electrical, electronic and programmable electronic systems, hardware and software aspects. .
EPROM.	A non-volatile storage medium which is electronically programmed. The EPROM device may be erased by strong ultra-violet light
IL	Instruction List. A low level IEC1131 language, similar to the simple textual PLC's language.
Industrial Processor	High performance processor for use in non safety-related applications which can be used in a simplex or dual-redundant configuration.
Input Module	Interface that converts input signals from external devices into signals that the control system can utilise.
I/O	Input/Output conditioning circuits (as distinct from the central processing).
I/O Driver	Essential software to allow the IEC1131 TOOLSET to configure and program unique types of TMR system I/O interfaces.
LD	Ladder Diagram. An IEC1131 language composed of contact symbols representing logical equations and simple actions. The main function of the ladder diagram is to control outputs based on input conditions.
MMI	Man Machine Interface. The operator's window to monitoring and keys, knobs, switches, Graphical User Interface of the Operator Workstation, etc. for making adjustments in the process.
Modbus	An industry standard communications protocol developed by Modicon. Used to communicate with external devices such as distributed control systems (DCSs) or operator interfaces.
M-oo-N	m-out-of-n. See Voting System
Module	An electronic (generally pluggable) sub-system.

MORSE	Method for Object Reuse in Safety-critical Environments. Programming and configuration software tool for the Fastflex range of Remote I/O.
Output Module	Interface that converts output signals from the control system into signals that can actuate external devices.
Peer-to-Peer Communications	Allows two or more TMR Controllers to communicate with each other.
PCM	PCI Mezzanine Card
Protocol	A set of rules governing data flow in a communication system. The protocol governs such matters as the way a message is addressed and routed, how often it is sent, how to recover from transmission errors and how much information is to be sent.
PSU	Power Supply Unit.
RAM	Random Access Memory. A volatile (unless battery backed) form of read/write memory. The time to access different locations is the same. It may be static (SRAM - data held in a flip-flop) or dynamic (DRAM – data held as a capacitive charge).
Real Time	A method of data processing in which the data is acted upon immediately instead of being accumulated and processed in batches.
Redundancy	The employment of two or more devices, each performing the same function, in order to improve reliability.
RISC	Reduced Instruction Set Computer
RS-232C, RS-422, RS-485	Standard interfaces introduced by the Energy Industries Association covering the electrical connection between data communication equipment. RS-232C is the most commonly used interface,. However, RS-422 allows for high transmission rates over greatly increased distances.
RTU	Remote Telemetry Unit
Safety	Where TÜV certification is a requirement, the Safety Chapter prescribes how to use the TMR system in a safety-related application.
SFC	Sequential Function Chart. A IEC1131 language that divides the process cycle into a number of well-defined steps separated by transitions.

SIL	Safety Integrity Level. One of four possible discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety-related systems. SIL4 has the highest level of safety integrity; SIL1 has the lowest.
Slot	A slot is the term given to the physical allocation of a module within a 483mm (19 inch) frame.
SmartSlot	Spare module slot position wired, and configured to enable any one of a number of modules of the same type to be 'hot' replaced as necessary.
SOE	Sequence of Events
Software (Application Software)	Software specific to the user application. Generally, it contains logic sequences, permissives, limits, expressions, etc. that control the appropriate input, output, calculations and decisions necessary to meet system safety functional requirements.
ST	Structured Text. A high level IEC1131 structured language with a syntax similar to Pascal. Used mainly to implement complex procedures that cannot be expressed easily with graphical languages.
Swingframe	An empty hinged metal surround, designed to contain 483mm (19 inch) standard equipment.
Synchronous	A data-communication term describing the method by which signals between computers are timed. In synchronous communications, a pre-arranged number of bits is expected to be sent across a line per second. To synchronise the sending and receiving machines, a clocking signal is sent on the same line by the transmitting computer. There are no start or stop bits in synchronous communications.
System Engineering Toolset	Sophisticated software package which can be used to reduce the time to perform applications engineering, manufacturing, validation and support of the TMR system
TMR	Triple Modular Redundancy.
TMR Interface	An interface between the TMR Controller and 6U format TMR I/O Modules (Low Density I/O)
8000 Series	Certified family of products for use in a wide range of controls applications including safety, continuous process, supervisory control/data acquisition, and integrated control and safety.

Communications Interface	An intelligent communications module which interfaces between a TMR Controller and an Engineering Workstation, third party equipment or other TMR Controllers.
TMR Processor	A processor for use in safety-related applications of the 8000 series system. Handles application program execution, diagnostics and reporting functions. The TMR Processor uses three high performance RISC processors based on patented TMR architecture arranged in a lock-step configuration.
TÜV Certification	Independent third party certification against a defined range of International standards including DIN V VDE 0801, IEC 61508, IEC 801.
U	Units of electronic module size (1-³/₄ inches).
Voting System	Redundant system (e.g. m out of n, 1-oo-2, 2-oo-3 etc.) which requires at least m of the n channels to be in agreement before the system can take action.
Watchdog	Watchdog circuitry provides dynamic and/or static monitoring of processor operation and is used to annunciate processor or processor related failures.

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SAFETY MANUAL

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE OF SAFETY

The 8000 series TMR system has been designed and certified for use in safety related applications. To ensure that systems build upon these foundations, it is necessary to impose requirements on the way such systems are designed, built, tested, installed and commissioned, operated, maintained and de-commissioned. This Manual sets out the requirements to be met during the lifecycle stages of safety-related systems to ensure that the safety objectives of the safety system are achieved

This Manual is intended primarily for system integrators. It is assumed that the reader has a thorough understanding of the intended application and can translate readily between the generic terms used within this Manual and the terminology specific to the integrator's or project's application area.

The TMR system has been independently certified by the German certification authority Technischer Überwachungs-Verein (TÜV) to meet the requirements of IEC 61508 SIL 3, DIN V VDE 0801 Requirements Class 6 (AK6).

The content of this Manual has been reviewed by TÜV and it represents the requirements that shall be fulfilled to achieve certifiable safety-related systems up to SIL 3 (AK6). Conditions and configurations that shall be adhered to if the system is to remain in compliance with the requirements of SIL 3 or AK6 certification are clearly marked.

The information contained in this Manual is intended for use by engineers and system integrators and is not intended to be a substitute for expertise or experience in safety-related systems. Requirements for quality systems, documentation and competence are included within this document; these are requirements, and NOT replacements, for an operating company's or integrator's quality systems, procedures and practices. The system integrator remains responsible for the generation of procedures and practices applicable to its business, and shall ensure that these are in accordance with the requirements defined herein. The application of such procedures and practices is also the responsibility of the system integrator, however, these shall be considered mandatory for systems for SIL 3 or AK5/6 applications.

1.2 ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

The following documents are associated with the safety requirements applicable to the TMR system or provide supporting information via TÜV web Site.

Document	Title
DIN V VDE 0801, including Addendum A1	Principles for Computers in Safety Related Systems
DIN V 19250	Fundamental Aspects to be considered for Measurement and Control Equipment "Maintenance Override" by TÜV Süddeutschland / TÜV Product Service GmbH and TÜV Rheinland
IEC61508	Functional Safety of Programmable Electronic Systems
IEC61511	Functional safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the process industry sector
EN54-2	Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems
NFPA 72	Fire Alarm Systems
NFPA 85	Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code – 2001 Edition
NFPA 86	Standard for Ovens and Furnaces – 1999 Edition

Table 1 - Referenced documents

An understanding of basic safety and functional safety principles and the content of these standards in particular are highly recommended. The principles of these standards should be thoroughly understood before generating procedures and practises to meet the requirements of this Safety Manual.

1.3 TERMINOLOGY

The terms 'certification' and 'certified' are used widely within this Manual. Within the context of this Manual, these terms refer to the functional safety certification of the product to IEC 61508 SIL 3, DIN V VDE 0801 AK6 and DIN V 19250. The 8000 series as a product is certified to a wider range of standards that are outside the scope of this Safety Manual.

This Manual contains rules and recommendations:

Rules are mandatory and must be followed if the resulting system is to be a SIL 3 or AK6 compliant application. These are identified by terms such as 'shall'.

Recommendations are not mandatory, but if they are not followed, extra safety precautions must be taken in order to certify the system. Recommendations are identified by terms such as 'it is strongly recommended'.

1.3.1 Safety and Functional Safety

Safety: The expectation that a system will not lead to risk to human life or health.

Safety is traditionally associated with the characteristics or hazards resulting from the system itself; including fire hazards, electrical safety, etc. The requirements to be satisfied by the integrator here include wiring, protective covers, selection of materials, etc.

Functional Safety: The ability of a system to carry out the actions necessary to achieve or to maintain a safe state for the process and its associated equipment.

Functional safety is considered the ability of the system to perform its required safety function. The requirements on the integrator here are to take the steps necessary to ensure that system is free from faults, errors, and correctly implements the required safety functions.

This Manual concentrates on functional safety; it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the methods of achieving basic safety.

1.3.2 Safety Integrity and Risk Class Levels

Risk class levels are defined within DIN V VDE 19250, with methods of achieving these levels defined in DIN V VDE 0801 and addendum A1. These standards define 8 risk class levels AK1 to AK8, AK1 being the lowest, AK8 the highest.

The TMR system is certified for use for applications to SIL 3 or AK6 and AK5 for subsections of the system using low density I/O.

A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined in IEC61508/IEC61511 as one of four possible discrete levels for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety-related system. SIL 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; SIL 1 has the lowest. Published tables, duplicated below, show the "equivalence" between DIN V VDE 0801 requirements classes (AK) and IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Levels (SILs):

DIN V VDE 0801 Requirements Class (AK)	IEC 61508/IEC 61511 Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
1	No equivalent
2	1
3	
4	2
5	3
6	
7	4
8	No Equivalent

Table 2 – Equivalent Standards

However, IEC61508 requires that the complete installation meet these requirements in order to achieve an overall SIL. The system covered by this technical manual forms only a part of such requirements.

1.3.3 Process Safety Time (PST)

Every process has a safety time that is the period that the process can be controlled by a faulty control-output signal without entering a dangerous condition. This is a function of the process dynamic and the level of safety built into the process plant. The Process Safety Time¹ (PST) can range from seconds to hours, depending on the process. In instances where the process has a high demand rate and/or highly dynamic process the PST will be short, for example, turbine control applications may dictate process safety times down to around 100ms

The PST dictates the response time for the combination of the sensor, actuators and each realised control or safety function. For demand or event-driven elements of the system, the response time of the system shall be considerably less than:

(PST- Sensor and actuator delay)

For convenience within this document, we will refer to the element of the PST relevant to the system's response time as PST_E, effective PST.

For cyclic elements of the system, the system's scan time shall be considerably less than of the effective PST, i.e.:

**$\frac{1}{2}$ (PST- Sensor and actuator delay), or
 $\frac{1}{2}$ (PST_E)**

The response time in the context of the process safety time must consider the system's ability to respond, i.e. its probability of failure on demand (including its ability to fulfil the required function within the required time). The probability of failure on demand is a function of the system's architecture, its self-test interval and its β -factor². If the system architecture provided no fault tolerance, it would be necessary to ensure that the sum of the response times (including sensors and actuators) and the fault detection time does not exceed the process safety time.

In practice, many of a system's self-test intervals vary from seconds to hours depending on the element of the system under test. For higher requirements, the system architecture shall provide sufficient fault tolerance, or faults shall result in fail-safe actions, i.e. there shall be no potential covert failures for those safety-related elements of the system. Degraded Operation

Non-fault tolerant (simplex) systems, by definition, do not have the ability to continue their operation in the presence of fault conditions. If we consider a digital point, the state may be 0, 1, or undefined (X). In the case of a fault within a non-fault tolerant system we would normally assume that the state becomes undefined in the presence of faults. For safety applications, however, it is necessary to be able to define how the system will respond in the presence of faults and as faults accumulate, this is the system's defined degraded operation. Traditionally, 0 is considered the fail-safe state, and 1 considered the operable condition. A standard non-fault tolerant system would therefore be 1 channel operating (or 1-out of-1), degrading to undefined (X) in the case of a fault. Obviously, this would be undesirable for safety applications, where we require a fail-safe reaction in the case of a fault, a system providing this operation would be 1-oo-1 fail-safe, or 1→0.

The additional element in the degradation path is that the fault may occur but may be hidden, or covert. The fault could be such that it prevents the system from responding when required to do so. Obviously, this would also be unacceptable for safety

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- 1 The only source of information about the PST is the designer's Loss Prevention Engineer. This data is not normally supplied at bid or at the manufacturing stage, so a direct request for information should be made. This data must form part of the safety considerations for the system and design reviews must be a fundamental part of safety engineering.
 - 2 The β -factor is a measure of common cause failure and is dependent on the equipment's original design, which is assessed and certified independently, and the implementation of the guidance providing within this Safety Chapter. The compact nature of the TMR system provides a β -factor of better than 1%.

applications. To detect the presence of these covert faults, it is necessary to perform tests, or diagnostics on the system. Detection of the covert fault is then used to force the system to its fail-safe condition. For a non-fault tolerant (simplex) system with diagnostics, this is referred to as 1-oo-1D.

Fault tolerant systems have redundant elements that allow the system to continue operation or to ensure that the system fails safety in the presence of faults. For example, a dual system may be 1-oo-2 (also known as 2v2), with either channel able to initiate the fail-safe reaction, or 2-oo-2 (1v2) requiring both channels to initiate the fail-safe reaction. The 1-oo-2 system provides a greater period between potential failure to respond to a hazard, but a higher probability of spurious responses. The 2-oo-2 system providing a greater period between spurious responses, but a higher chance of not responding when required. It is also possible to have dual systems with diagnostics to address covert failures and help redress the balance between failure to respond and spurious response. A dual system could therefore be 2-oo-2D reverting to 1-oo-1D reverting to fail-safe, or 2→1→0.

Consider a simple triplicated system, as shown in Figure 1. The input and output devices are assumed to be simply wired to the input and output channels to provide the requisite distribution and voting. We have assumed that the output vote is a simple majority vote for this purpose. Note with non-8000 series systems there may be a need for a common output-voting element.




Figure 1 - Simple Triplicated System

A failure in any element of each channel, e.g. Ch. A Input, will result in that complete channel's failure. If this failure is fail-safe, only 1 of the remaining channels needs to respond to a demand condition to generate the safe reaction. If a second channel fails safe then the overall system will fail-safe. This is therefore a 3-2-0 architecture. Typically diagnostics are used to ensure that the fail-safe state can be assured, the operation is therefore 2-oo-3D, reverting to 1-oo-2D, reverting to fail-safe.

The 8000 series is a TMR system; this means that each stage of the system is triplicated, with the results from each preceding stage majority voted to provide both fault tolerance and fault detection. Diagnostics are also used to ensure that covert failures are detected and result in the correct fail-safe reaction. For example, a fault within Input Ch. A will be localised to that input, and unlike the standard triplicated system, will allow Processor Ch. A and Output Ch. A to continue operation, i.e. the input is now operating 1-oo-2D whilst the remainder of the system continues to operate 2-oo-3.




Figure 2 – TMR Architecture

The 8000 Series utilises this Triple Modular Redundant architecture with diagnostics, supporting a 2-oo-3D reverting to 1-oo-2D reverting to fail-safe, or 3-2-0 operation. The 1-oo-2D operation is a transient mode of operation where active and standby modules are installed; in this case, the degradation is 3-2-3-2-0.

The architecture, and hence degradation modes for low density I/O may be selected as required, see para. 3.2 in this Manual for further details.

1.4 THE 8000 SERIES OVERVIEW

The TMR system is based on a triplicated microprocessor with internal redundancy of all critical circuits. The system controls complex and often critical processes in real time - executing programs that accept external sensor signals, solving logic equations, performing calculations for continuous process control and generating external control signals. These user-defined application programs monitor and control real-world processes in the oil and gas, refining, rail transit, power generation and related industries across a wide range of control and safety applications. The TMR system is certified for use in safety-related applications such as fire and gas detection, and emergency shutdown up to requirements class 6 according to DIN V 19250 and IEC 61508 SIL 3.

Application programs for the TMR system are written and monitored using the **IEC1131 TOOLSET**, a Microsoft® Windows NT™, Windows 2000™, or Windows XP™, based software suite running on a personal computer.

The TMR architecture provides a flexibility that allows each system to be easily adapted to the different needs of any installation. This flexibility permits the user to choose from different levels of I/O fault protection and provides a variety of I/O interfacing and communications methods, thereby allowing the system to communicate with other equipment and field devices.

Those elements of the system that are to be used in safety-related operations are certified to IEC 61508 SIL 3, DIN –V –VDE 0801, AK6. The remaining elements of the system are certified for non-interfering operation.

This manual covers the release as specified in the certified module list.

2. SAFETY PRINCIPLES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This paragraph provides an overview of generic safety principles with emphasis on the system integration process. These principles are applicable to all safety-related systems, including, but not limited to, the 8000 series system.

2.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT

A prerequisite for the achievement of functional safety is the implementation of procedural measures applicable to the safety lifecycle; these are collectively referred to as a Safety Management System. The Safety Management System defines the generic management and technical activities necessary for functional safety. In many cases, the Safety Management and Quality systems will be integrated within a single set of procedures. It is highly recommended that the integrator have a quality management system in accordance with ISO9000.

The safety management system shall include:

- A statement of the policy and strategy to achieving functional safety.
- A Safety Planning Procedure. This shall result in the definition of the safety lifecycle stages to be applied, the measures and techniques to be applied at each stage, and responsibilities for completing these activities.
- Definitions of the records to be produced and methods of managing these records, including change control. The change control procedures shall include records of modification requests, the impact analysis of proposed modifications and the approval of modifications. The baseline for change control shall be defined clearly.
- Configuration items shall be uniquely identified and include version information, e.g. system and safety requirements, system design documentation and drawings, application software source code, test plans, test procedures and results.
- Methods of ensuring that persons are competent to undertake their activities and fulfil their responsibilities.

Expansion of these requirements is included within the following sub-paragraphs.

2.2.1 Safety Lifecycle

The Safety Lifecycle is designed to structure a system's production into defined stages and activities, and should include the following elements:

- Scope definition
- Functional requirements specification
- System safety requirements specification
- System engineering
- Application programming
- System production
- System integration
- System safety validation
- System installation and commissioning
- System operation and maintenance procedures
- System modification
- Decommissioning

The definition of each lifecycle stage shall include its inputs, outputs and verification activities. It is not necessary to have stages within the lifecycle addressing each of these elements independently; it is important that all of these stages be covered within the lifecycle. Specific items that need to be considered for each of these lifecycle elements are described in the following sub-paragraphs.

2.2.1.1 Scope Definition

The initial step in the system lifecycle should establish the bounds of the safety-related system and a clear definition of its interfaces with the process and all third party equipment. This stage should also establish the requirements resulting from the intended installation environment, including climatic conditions, power sources, etc.

In most cases, the client will provide this information. It is necessary to review this information and establish a thorough understanding of the intended application, the bounds of the system to be provided and its intended operating conditions. An example checklist for the review of the scope definition is given in para. 4.1.1.

2.2.1.2 Functional Requirements

This stage is to establish the complete set of functions to be implemented by the system. The timing requirements for each of the functions are also to be established. Where possible, the functions should be allocated to defined modes of operation of the process.

For each function, it is necessary to identify the process interfaces involved in each of the functions. Similarly, where the function involves data interchanged with third party equipment, the data and interface are to be clearly identified. Where non-standard field devices, communications interfaces or communications protocols are required, it is important that the detailed requirements for these interfaces be established and recorded at this stage. In general, the client will provide the functional requirements. It is, however, necessary to collate these requirements into a document, or document set, including any clarification of the functional requirements. In cases where the client provides the functional requirements in an ambiguous form it will be necessary to clarify, document and establish agreement on the requirements with the client. It is recommended that logic diagrams be used to represent the required functionality. An example checklist for the review of the functional requirements is given in para. 4.1.2.

2.2.1.3 Safety Requirements

The functional requirements shall be analysed to determine their safety relevance. Where necessary, additional requirements shall be established to ensure that the plant will fail-safe in the case of failures within the plant, the safety-related system, external equipment and communications or the safety-related system's environment.

For each safety-related function the required safety requirements class and safety-related timing requirements shall be defined. The client should supply this information. Where this information is not supplied it shall be established and agreed with the client as part of this phase. It is highly recommended that the client approve the resulting safety requirements. An example checklist for the review of the safety requirements is given in para. 4.1.3.

2.2.1.4 Systems Engineering

This stage realises the safety-related system design. It is recommended that the engineering comprise two stages, the first defining the overall system architecture, and the second detailing the engineering of the architectural blocks.

The overall system architecture shall identify the individual systems. The architecture for these systems and for their sub-systems shall include any diverse or other technology elements.

The architectural definition shall include the required safety requirements class for each architectural element and identify the safety functions allocated to that element. Additional safety functions resulting from the selected system architecture shall be defined at this stage. The detailed engineering shall refine the architectural elements and culminate in detailed information for system build. The detailed design shall be in a form that is readable, readily understood and allows for simple inspection/review.

Tools used within the system engineering process are to be carefully selected, with due consideration of the potential of introduction of error and the required safety requirements class. Where there remains the possibility of error, procedural methods of detecting such errors shall be included within the process.

2.2.1.4.1 Safety Requirements Allocations

The overall system architecture shall define the individual system. The architecture for these systems, and for their sub-systems, shall include any diverse or other technology elements. The architectural definition shall also define the required safety requirements class for each architectural element and identify the safety functions allocated to that element. Additional safety functions resulting from the selected system architecture will be defined at this stage.

The detailed engineering shall refine the architectural elements and culminate in detailed information for system build. The detailed design shall be in a form that is readable, readily understood and allows for simple inspection/review.

Tools used within the system engineering process are to be carefully selected, with due consideration of the potential for the possibility of introduction of error and the required safety requirements class. Where there remains the possibility of error, procedural methods of detecting such errors shall be included within the process.

2.2.1.5 Application Programming

An overall Application Program software architecture is to be defined. This architecture will identify the software blocks and their allotted functions.

The application architectural design shall be used to define the additional requirements resulting from the system hardware design. Specifically, methods for addressing system specific testing, diagnostics and fault reporting are to be included.

It is highly recommended that simulation testing be performed on each software block. This simulation testing should be used to show that each block performs its intended functions and does not perform unintended functions.

It is also highly recommended that software integration testing be performed within the simulation environment before hardware-software integration. The software integration testing will show that all software blocks interact correctly to perform their intended functions and do not perform unintended functions.

The development of the application software shall follow a structured development cycle; the minimum requirements of which are:

- **Architectural definition.** The application program shall be divided into largely self-contained 'blocks' to simplify the implementation and testing. Safety and non-safety functions should be separated as far as possible at this stage.
- **Detailed design and coding.** This stage details the design, and implements each of the blocks identified during the architectural definition.
- **Testing.** This stage verifies the operation of the application; it is recommended that the application blocks first be tested individually and then integrated and tested as a whole. This should be initially undertaken within the simulation environment.

The resultant Application Programs shall be integrated with the system hardware and integration testing performed.

2.2.1.6 System Production

The system production stage implements the detailed system design. The production techniques, tools and equipment used within the production testing of the system shall be commensurate with the required safety requirements class.

2.2.1.7 System Integration

This stage shall integrate the Application Programs with the target systems. Where multiple systems are used to meet the overall requirement, it is suggested that each system undergoes individual application program and target system integration before overall system integration is performed. To meet the requirements of the intended safety requirements class, the system integration shall ensure the compatibility of the software and hardware.

2.2.1.8 Installation and Commissioning

The system installation stage shall define the steps to be undertaken to ensure that the system is installed correctly and commissioned on the plant. These steps shall include the physical and electrical installation of the system.

The installation environment is a potential source of common cause failure. Therefore, it is vital that compatibility of the equipment is established. The 'environment' for these purposes includes the climatic, hazardous area, power, earthing and EMC conditions. In many cases, there may not be a single installation environment. Elements of the system may be installed in differing location, i.e. central control room, equipment rooms and field installations. In these cases, it is important to establish the equipment and environment compatibility for each site.

The first step in the installation sequence is typically the physical installation of the system. Where the system comprises a number of physically separate units, it is important that the sequence of installation be established. This may include the installation of termination facilities before the remaining elements of the system. In these cases, it is important to establish that independent installation and testing facilities are available.

Each installation shall be designed to ensure that the control equipment is not operated in environments that are beyond its design tolerances. Therefore, consideration should be given to the proper control of temperature, humidity, vibration and shock, as well as adequate shielding and earthing to ensure that exposure to electromagnetic interference and electrostatic discharge sources are minimised.

The commissioning stage is to establish the system hook-up and verify its correct 'end-to-end' functionality, including the connection between the TMR system and the required sensors and final elements. It is likely that groups of functions are commissioned rather than the system as a whole, i.e. accommodation area functions before production functions. In these cases, it is important to establish the commissioning sequence and the measures to be taken to ensure safe operation during periods of partial commissioning. These measures shall be system specific and shall be defined clearly before commissioning. It is important to establish that any temporary measures implemented for test purposes or to allow partial commissioning are removed before the system, as a whole, becomes live.

Records shall be maintained throughout the commissioning process. These records shall include records of the tests completed, problem reports and resolution of these problems.

2.2.1.9 Safety System Validation

Safety system validation shall test the integrated system to ensure compliance with the requirements specification at the intended safety requirements class. The validation activities should include those necessary to establish that the required safety functions have been implemented under normal start-up, shutdown and abnormal fault modes.

The validation shall ensure that each functional safety requirement has been implemented at the required safety integrity level, and that the realisation of the function achieves its performance criteria, specifically that the process safety time requirements have been met. The validation shall also consider the potential external common cause failures, i.e. power sources, environmental conditions, and ensure that the system will provide fail-safe operation in the event of conditions exceeding its capabilities.

2.2.1.10 Operation and Maintenance Plan

This Operation and Maintenance requirement ensures that functional safety continues beyond the design, production, installation and commissioning of the system. The in-service operation and maintenance is normally beyond the system integrator responsibility. However, guidance and procedures shall be provided to ensure that the persons or organisations responsible for Operation and Maintenance maintain the intended safety levels.

The Operating and Maintenance Plan shall include the following:

- Although the TMR product requires no specific power-up and power-down requirements, it is possible that the project specific implementation will dictate specific action sequences. These sequences shall be clearly defined, ensuring that the sequences cannot result in periods of the system's inability to respond safely whilst a hazard may be present.
- The Maintenance Plan shall detail the procedures to be adopted when re-calibrating sensors, actuators and I/O modules. The recommended calibration periods shall also be included.
- The Maintenance Plan shall include the procedure to be adopted for testing the system, and the maximum intervals between manual testing.
- Sensor and actuator maintenance will require the application of overrides in certain circumstances. Where these are required, they shall be implemented in accordance with the guidance provided within this document.

2.2.1.10.1 Planned Maintenance

In most system configurations there will be some elements that are not tested by the system's internal test facilities. These may be the final passive elements in some I/O modules types, the sensors and actuators themselves and the field wiring. A regime of Planned Maintenance testing shall be adopted to ensure that faults do not accumulate within those elements that could ultimately lead to the system's inability to perform its required safety functions. The maximum interval between these tests shall be defined during the system design, i.e. before installation. It is highly recommended that the test interval be less than 12 months.

2.2.1.10.2 Field Device Maintenance

During the lifetime of the system, it will be necessary to undertake a number of field maintenance activities that will include re-calibration, testing and replacement of devices. Facilities should be included within the system design to allow these maintenance activities to be undertaken. Similarly, the operating and maintenance plan needs to include these maintenance activities, and their effect on the system operation and design. In general, adequate provision for these measures will be defined by the client, and provided the facilities, i.e. maintenance overrides, are implemented within the requirements specified within this document. No further safety requirements will be required.

It is highly recommended that the I/O forcing capability NOT be used to support field device maintenance; this facility is provided to support application testing only. Should this facility be used, the requirements defined in para. 3.8 shall be applied.

2.2.1.10.3 Module Fault Handling

When properly configured and installed, the TMR system is designed to operate continuously and correctly even if one of its modules has a fault. When a module does have a fault it should be replaced promptly to ensure that faults do not accumulate, thereby causing multiple failure conditions that could cause a plant shutdown. All modules permit live removal and replacement, and modules within a fault-tolerant configuration can be removed with no further action. Modules that do not have a partner slot or smart slot configured and have a fail-safe configuration will require the application of override or bypass signals for the period of the module removal to ensure that unwanted safety responses are not generated inadvertently.

On-site repair of modules is not supported; all failed modules should be returned for repair and/or fault diagnosis. The return procedure for modules should include procedures to identify the nature and circumstances of the failure and the system response. Records of module failures and repair actions shall be maintained.

2.2.1.10.4 Monitoring

In order to establish that the safety objectives have been met through the lifetime of the system it is important to maintain records of the faults, failures and anomalies. This requires the maintenance of records by both the end-user and the system integrator. The records maintained by the end-user are outside the scope of this document; however, it is highly recommended that the following information be included:

- Description of the fault, failure or anomaly
- Details of the equipment involved, including module types and serial numbers where appropriate
- When the fault was experienced and any circumstances leading to its occurrence
- Any temporary measures implemented to correct or work around the problem
- Description of the resolution of the problem and reference to remedial action plans and impact analysis

Each system integrator should define the field returns, repair and defect handling procedure. The information requirements placed on the end user because of this procedure should be clearly documented and provided to the end user. The defect handling procedure shall include:

- Method of detecting product related defects and the reporting of these to the original designers.

- Methods for detecting systematic failure that may affect other elements of the system or other systems, and links to the satisfactory resolution of the issues.
- Procedures for tracking all reported anomalies, their work around and/or resultant corrective action where applicable.

2.2.1.11 System Modification

Design changes will inevitably occur during the system lifecycle; to ensure that the system safety is maintained, such changes shall be carefully managed. Procedures defining the measures to be adopted when updating the plant or system shall be documented. These procedures shall be the responsibility of the end-user. The system integrator shall provide sufficient guidance to ensure that these procedures maintain the required level of functional safety. Special consideration shall be given to the procedures to be adopted in case of product level updates and enhancement, i.e. module and firmware updates. Updates to the system shall include considerations of the requirements for application changes and firmware changes. These procedural measures shall include:

- Requirement to undertake impact analysis of any such changes
- The measures to be implemented during the modification to the system and its programming. These measures shall be in-line with the requirements within this document. Specifically, the requirements defined in sections 2.2 to 2.2.1.8 shall be applied, as well as the additional requirements defined in this paragraph (2.2.1.11).
- The definition of these procedures shall include the review and authorisation process to be adopted for system changes.

2.2.1.11.1 Baselines

Baselines shall be declared beyond which any change shall follow the formal change management procedure. The point within the lifecycle at which these baselines are declared depends on the detail of the processes involved, the complexity of the system, how amenable to change these processes are, and the required safety requirements class. It is recommended that the baseline for formal change process is the completion of each step in the lifecycle. However, as a minimum the baseline shall be declared before the presence of the potential hazards, i.e. before start-up.

2.2.1.11.2 Modification Records

Records of each requested or required change shall be maintained. The change management procedure shall include the consideration of the impact of each of the required/requested changes before authorising the implementation of the change. The implementation of the change should repeat those elements of the lifecycle appropriate to the change. The test of the resultant changes should include non-regression testing in addition to test of the change itself.

2.2.1.12 Decommissioning

The procedure for decommissioning the system shall be defined. This procedure is to include any specific requirements for the safe decommissioning of the system and, where applicable, the safe disposal or return of materials.

As with commissioning, it is likely that the decommissioning be performed in a phased manner. The decommissioning procedure shall ensure that a plan be developed that maintains the functional safety whilst the corresponding hazards are present. Similarly, the installation environment of the control equipment shall be maintained within its operating envelope whilst it is required to function.

- The decommissioning plan shall identify the sequence that the hazards are to be removed.
- Methods shall be defined to ensure that the interaction between safety functions can be removed without initiating safety responses and still maintain safety functionality for the remaining potential hazards. This shall include the interaction between systems.
- The decommissioning procedure shall define which modules/materials are to be returned for safe disposal following decommissioning.

2.3 FUNCTIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The functional safety assessment process shall confirm the effectiveness of the achievement of functional safety for the system. The functional safety assessment, in this context, is limited to the safety-related system and will ensure that the system is designed, constructed and installed in accordance with the safety requirements.

Each required safety function and its required safety properties shall be considered. The effects of faults and errors within the system and application programs, failure external to the system and procedural deficiencies in these safety functions are to be considered.

The assessments are to be undertaken by an audit team that shall include personnel outside of the project. At least one functional safety assessment shall be performed before the presence of the potential hazards, i.e. before start-up.

2.3.1 Competency

The achievement of functional safety requires the implementation of the safety lifecycle and ensuring that persons who are responsible for any safety lifecycle activities are competent to discharge those responsibilities.

All persons involved in any safety lifecycle activity, including management activities, shall have the appropriate training, technical knowledge, experience and qualifications relevant to the specific duties they have to perform. The suitability of persons for their designated safety lifecycle activities shall be based on the specific competency factors relevant to the particular application and shall be recorded.

The following competence factors should be addressed when assessing and justifying the competence of persons to carry out their duties:

- Engineering experience appropriate to the application area.
- Engineering experience appropriate to the technology.
- Safety engineering experience appropriate to the technology.
- Knowledge of the legal and safety regulatory framework.
- The consequences of failure of the safety-related system.
- The safety requirements class of the safety-related systems.
- The novelty of the design, design procedures or application.
- Previous experience and its relevance to the specific duties to be performed and the technology being employed.

In all of the above, the higher risk will require increased rigour with the specification and assessment of the competence.

3. SYSTEM RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This paragraph expands on and applies the safety principles described earlier in this Manual. Many of the recommendations within this paragraph are equally applicable to other safety-related systems. However, the details of the recommendations or requirements are specific to the TMR system.

3.2 I/O ARCHITECTURES

The TMR system has very comprehensive internal diagnostics that reveal both covert and overt failures. The hardware implementation of many of the fault tolerance and fault detection mechanisms provides for rapid fault detection for most system elements. Self-test facilities used to diagnose faults within the remainder of the system are defined to provide optimum safety availability. These self-test facilities may require short periods of off-line operation or introduce conditions, i.e. alarm or fault test conditions, which effectively result in the point being off-line within that redundant channel. Within TMR configurations, this period of off-line operation only affects the system's ability to respond under multiple fault conditions.

The TMR Processors, TMR Interfaces, Expander Interfaces and Expander Processors are all naturally redundant and have been designed to withstand multiple faults and support a fixed on-line repair configuration in adjacent slots and therefore require little further consideration. The input and output modules support a number of architecture options, the effects of the chosen architecture should be evaluated against the system and application specific requirements.

3.2.1 Safety-Related Configurations

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
TMR Processor 8110	2oo3	Certified as safety-related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6 in single module or active/standby configurations.
TMR Processor 8110B (IRIG-B)	2oo3	Certified as safety-related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6 in single module or active/standby configurations. IRIG-B functionality is interference free and can not be used for safety functions
TMR Interface 8160	2oo3	Certified as safety-related and can be used for safety-critical applications in AK5 in single module or active/standby configurations.
Communication Interface 8150 / 8151 / 8151B	Not safety related but interference free	Certified as non-interfering safety-related and can be used for safety-critical communication in SIL 3 or AK6 as part of the grey channel in single or dual module configurations.
Expander Modules, (XIM / XPM) 8310 / 8311	Not safety related but interference free 2oo3	Certified as non-interfering safety-related and can be used for safety-critical communication in SIL 3 or AK6 as part of the grey channel in single module or master/slave configurations.
Fiber TX/RX Unit 8314	Not safety related but interference free 2oo3	Certified as non-interfering safety-related and can be used for safety-critical communication in SIL 3 or AK6.

Table 3 - Central Modules

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Digital Inputs 8403, Triplicated, 24 VDC 8423, Triplicated, 120VDC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4.
Digital Inputs 8402, Dual, 24 VDC	Internal 1oo2D (1oo2 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4. Time-limited operation in degraded mode
Analog Inputs 8431, Triplicated 8433, Triplicated, isolated	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Within the manufactures specified safety accuracy limits. The safety state of the analogue input has to be defined to 0 mA/0 V Certified SIL 3 or AK6.
Analog Inputs 8432, Dual	Internal 1oo2D (1oo2 implemented in a single module)	Within the manufactures specified safety accuracy limits. The safety state of the analogue input has to be defined to 0 mA/0 V Time-limited operation in degraded mode. Certified: SIL 3 or AK6

Table 4 - Input Modules High Density I/O

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Digital Outputs 8451, Triplicated 24 VDC 8471, Triplicated 120VDC 8461, Triplicated 48VDC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4. May be used in single module or master/slave configurations.
Digital Outputs 8472, Triplicated 120VAC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4. May be used in single module or master/slave configurations.
Analog Outputs 8480 Analog Output 4-20 mA	Not safety related but interference free	Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical output devices.

Table 5 - Output Modules High Density I/O

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Pulse Generator 8444, Triplicated, 24VDC	Not safety related but interference free	Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical devices.
Zone Interface 8448 Triplicated, 24VDC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	<p>Outputs:</p> <p>Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6.</p> <p>Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4.</p> <p>May be used in single module or master/slave configurations.</p>
		<p>Inputs:</p> <p>Normally de-energized (energize to trip): only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4, and only for "trip amplifier" (like gas inputs) or quasi digital inputs (like fire loops).</p> <p>Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified only if the inputs are dynamically transitioned at a period not greater than the second fault occurrence time.</p> <p>Analog measurements: certified only if the input is dynamically exercised over its full range within a period shorter than the second fault occurrence time³.</p> <p>Non-interfering for non-safety-critical devices</p>
Valve Monitor 8449, Triplicated, 24VDC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	<p>Outputs:</p> <p>Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6.</p> <p>Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4.</p> <p>Safety critical valve may only be tested towards the safe position.</p> <p>May be used in single module or master/slave configurations.</p>
		<p>Inputs:</p> <p>Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical devices.</p>

Table 6 - Multi-purpose Modules, High Density I/O

³ The analog input must be exercised over its full range (i.e. 0 to 4095) over a period of time related to the safety accuracy specification of the module and the discrepancy detection time configured for the system. For typical systems, the discrepancy detection time is 200 seconds.

	Conditions
Controller Chassis 8100	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6
Expander Chassis 8300	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6
Power Supply Rack 820X	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6 together with either of the following power supply units providing reinforced insulation according to EN60950. Alternatively, any power supply compliant with IEC 61131-2 may be used
15Vdc Power Supply Unit 8220, 110 - 220 VAC, Dual Input	Providing reinforced insulation according to EN60950
24Vdc Power Supply Unit 8225, 110 - 220 VAC, Dual Input	Providing reinforced insulation according to EN60950

Table 7 - Auxiliary Modules

Revisions of modules are subject to change. A list of the released versions is held by TÜV or can be obtained from ICS Triplex Technology Ltd.

3.2.2 High-Density I/O

The High-Density I/O modules are either inherently triplicated or dual redundant with comprehensive self-test and diagnosis facilities. The self-tests are co-ordinated to ensure that a majority can be established even in case of a demand during the execution of the tests. Discrepancy and deviation monitoring further enhance the verification and fault detection. The TMR Processor tests internal interfaces to the controller. The culmination of these measures results in high levels of fault detection and tolerance, ultimately leading to fail-safe operation in the event of multiple fault conditions. The maximum fault detection time for each module type is specified within its associated Product Description. In all cases, even in the presence of a fault during this period, the system will continue to be able to respond. Under multiple fault conditions the second fault detection period within the repair time may need to be considered where the system is used in high or continuous demand safety applications.

All High Density I/O modules include line-monitoring facilities; it is recommended that these facilities be enabled for safety-related I/O. For normally de-energised I/O these facilities shall be enabled, see 3.2.4.




Figure 3 - Single High Density TMR I/O Module Architecture

The system supports single module, where it is acceptable to either stop the system or allow the signals corresponding to that module to change to their default state, and two active-standby configurations. The first active-standby configuration is to accommodate the active and spare modules in adjacent slot positions, the second is use the SmartSlot configuration where a single module position may be used as the spare for a number of active modules. All configurations may be used for safety-related applications; the choice between the configurations supporting live on-line repair is dependent on the end-user's preference and the number of faulty modules to be repaired simultaneously.




Figure 4 - SmartSlot or Adjacent Slot TMR Module Configuration

The High Density I/O modules support the system's inherent TMR architecture. To announce the failure, diagnostic and status information is available within the corresponding module information available to the application programmer. Faults will also result in the generation of the corresponding front panel indication on the I/O module and the system healthy indicator and status output.

A majority fault condition on an I/O point, i.e. a fault beyond its fault tolerant capability, results in a fail-safe logical state (logical 0). The input state is forced to "unknown", state 0x07 in this condition and the analog level to -2048. The module fault status and fault codes will be set accordingly, and may be optionally used for remote diagnosis purposes.

The maximum duration for single-channel operation of High Density Dual I/O modules depends on the specific process and must be specified individually for each application. For a specific system configuration this time can be determined through a quantitative analysis performed by ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. using a TÜV approved modelling technique. If no calculation is available, the maximum duration for single channel operation is 72 hours for (SIL 3 or AK6) safety-related applications.

When a module is operating in a Dual mode (or degraded to a dual mode) and a state discrepancy occurs. If no module fault is detected, the state reported to the application will always be the lower of the two states for a digital module, and the higher of the two states for an analogue module.

In safety critical applications, the channel discrepancy alarms shall be monitored and alarmed to the operator.

The I/O modules use the active-standby arrangement to support bumpless on-line repair. The module architecture allows the faulty module to continue normal service until a replacement module is available and unlike conventional hot-standby configurations, allows for a controlled transfer even in the presence of a fault condition. The standby module may be permanently installed to reduce the repair time to an absolute minimum.

3.2.3 Analog Input Safety Accuracy

When High Density Analog input modules are used, the system uses the median value. The deviations between the redundant channels' measurements are monitored to determine if they are within the safety accuracy limit, refer to the associated module's Product Description for its safety accuracy specification. When a single channel measurement exceeds the safety accuracy limit then a discrepancy alarm is set for the input channel. Furthermore, should two or more redundant channel measurements exceed the safety accuracy limit then the reported channel value is set to -2048 and the channel line fault status set to True.



In safety critical applications, the line fault status shall be monitored by the application program and be used to initiate the appropriate safety function when two or more slice readings for a channel exceed the safety accuracy limit. Furthermore, the discrepancy alarms should be monitored and alarmed to the operator.

3.2.4 Energise to Action Configurations

Certain applications may require normally open (energise to action) input and energise to action outputs.



Normally de-energised configurations shall only be used if:

- the activation of the system is only mitigating an already existing hazard such as in fire and gas applications SIL 1 to SIL 3, or
- the activation of the system is a hazard itself and the system is used in a SIL 1 to SIL 3 application for 8000 series module and AK1 to AK4 compliant application for 7000 series modules.

Additionally the following restrictions apply:

- At least two independent power sources must be used. These power sources must provide emergency power for a safe process shutdown or a time span required by the application.
- Each power source must be provided with power integrity monitoring with safety critical input read back into the TMR system controller or implicit power monitoring provided by the I/O modules. Any power failure shall lead to an alarm.
- Unless provided implicitly in the I/O modules, all safety critical inputs and outputs must be fitted with external line and load integrity monitoring and safety critical read back of the line-status signals. Any line or load failure shall lead to an alarm.
- Only modules specifically identified for the use in restricted normally de-energized configurations shall be used.

In cases where one or more output is used in energise to trip configuration all specific requirements above are to be followed for all associated inputs.



If energise to trip safety-related outputs are used, line fault conditions shall be monitored by the system application and alarmed to plant operations personnel. Line monitor devices shall be installed as close to the field sensor (or actuator if required) as is practicable. Line fault status shall be monitored by the system application and alarmed to plant operations personnel.

Line monitoring may also be used in de-energise to trip safety critical input applications but is not specifically required.



When isolation barriers are used in safety critical applications, line-monitoring thresholds shall be configured to detect barrier faults. This ensures that barrier faults do not inhibit the safety critical function.

3.2.5 EN 60204 Category 0 & 1 Configurations

The system is fully compliant for use with category 0 application (de-energise to trip).

Category 1 configurations require a controlled stop with power available to the machine actuators to achieve the stop and then removal of power.

The 8000 system has a defined internal fail-safe state as de-energised. This could result in the defined shutdown delay being shortened in some cases of I/O failure, CPU failure or loss of power to the system.

3.2.6 NFPA 85 Requirements

The 8000 system is certified to be used in NFPA 85 compliant systems.

The systems should be integrated in accordance with NFPA 85. In particular the following shall be applied.

- The operator shall be provided with a dedicated manual switch that shall independently and directly actuate the safety shutdown trip relay. At least one identified manual switch shall be located remotely from the boiler where it can be reached in case of emergency.
- The burner management system shall be provided with independent logic, independent input/output systems, and independent power supplies and shall be a functionally and physically separate device from other logic systems, such as the boiler or HRSG control system.
- Momentary Closing of Fuel Valves. Logic sequences or devices intended to cause a safety shutdown, once initiated, shall cause a burner or master fuel trip, as applicable, and shall require operator action prior to resuming operation of the affected burner(s). No logic sequence or device shall be permitted that allows momentary closing and subsequent inadvertent reopening of the main or ignition fuel valves.
- Documentation shall be provided to the owner and operator, indicating that all safety devices and logic meet the requirements of the application.
- System response time (i.e. throughput) shall be sufficiently short to prevent negative effects on the application.

3.2.7 NFPA 86 Requirements

The 8000 system is certified to be used in NFPA 85 compliant systems.

The systems should be integrated in accordance with NFPA 85. In particular the following shall be applied.

- The supplier of the application software for the programmable controller shall provide the end user and the authority having jurisdiction with the documentation needed to verify that all related safety devices and safety logic are functional before the programmable controller is placed in operation.
- In the event of a power failure, the programmable controller (hardware and software) shall not prevent the system from reverting to a safe default condition. A safe condition shall be maintained upon the restoration of power.
- The control system shall have a separate manual emergency witch, independent of the programmable controller, that initiates a safe shutdown.
- Any changes to hardware or software shall be documented, approved, and maintained in a file on the site.
- System operation shall be tested and verified for compliance with this standard and the original design criteria whenever the programmable controller is replaced, repaired, or updated.
- Whenever application software that contains safety logic or detection logic is modified, system operation shall be verified for compliance with this standard and the original design criteria.
- The NFPA certification is only applicable where the system is applied in accordance with the safety manual and NFPA86 requirements.
- A programmable controller not listed for combustion safety service shall be permitted to monitor safety interlocks, or to provide burner control functions, provided that its use complies with both of the following:
 - (1) The programmable controller shall not interfere with or prevent the operation of the safety interlocks.
 - (2) Only isolated programmable controller contacts (not directly connected to a power source) shall be permitted to be wired in series with the safety interlocks to permit burner control functions.

3.2.8 EN54 Requirements

The 8000 system is certified to be used in NFPA 85 compliant systems.

The systems should be integrated in accordance with NFPA 85. In particular the following shall be applied.

- Where an alphanumeric display is used to display indications relating to different functional conditions these may be displayed at the same time. However for each functional condition there shall be only one window, in which all of the fields relating to that functional condition are grouped.
- Unless EN 54 section 7.12 applies, the time taken by scanning, interrogation, or other processing of signals from fire detectors, in addition to that required to take the fire alarm decision, shall not delay the indication of the fire alarm condition, or of a new zone in alarm by more than 10 s.
- The control and indicating equipment shall enter the fire alarm condition within 10 s of the activation of any manual call point
- The audible indication shall be capable of being silenced by means of a separate manual control at access level 1 or 2. This control shall only be used for silencing the audible indication, and may be the same as that used for silencing in the fault warning condition.
- The control and indicating equipment shall be capable of being reset from the fire alarm condition. This shall only be possible by means of a separate manual control at EN 54 defined access level 2. This control shall be used only for reset and may be the same as that used for reset from the fault warning condition.
- Unless 7.11 and/or 7.12 apply, the control and indicating equipment shall action all mandatory outputs within 3 s of the indication of a fire alarm condition
- Unless 7.11 applies, the control and indicating equipment shall action all mandatory outputs within 10 s of the activation of any manual call point.
- The control and indicating equipment shall enter the fault warning condition within 100 s of the occurrence of the fault or the reception of a fault signal, or within another time as specified in this European Standard or in other parts of EN 54.
- Total loss of the power supply (option with requirements)
 - In the event of the loss of the main power source (as specified in EN 54-4), the control and indicating equipment may have provision to recognise and indicate the failure of the standby power source to a point where it may no longer be possible to fulfil mandatory functions of this European Standard. In this case at least an audible indication shall be given for a period of at least one hour.
- A system fault shall be audibly indicated. This indication may be capable of being silenced.
- The cabinet of the control and indicating equipment shall be of robust construction, consistent with the method of installation recommended in the documentation. It shall meet at least classification IP30 of IEC 529:1989.
- All mandatory indications shall be visible at access level 1 without prior manual intervention (e.g. the need to open a door).
- If the control and indicating equipment is designed to be used with a power supply (item L of figure 1 of EN 54-1) contained in a separate cabinet, then an interface shall be provided for at least two transmission paths to the power supply, such that a short circuit or an interruption in one does not affect the other.

[EN54 section 7.12 Co-occurrence detection (option with requirements)]

Following the receipt of a signal from a fire detector, and until one or more confirmatory signals are received from the same or other points, the c.i.e. may have provision to inhibit either the indication of the fire alarm condition, or the operation of outputs to

- fire alarm devices (item C of figure 1 of EN 54-1), and/or;
- fire alarm routing equipment (item E of figure 1 of EN 54-1), and/or;
- fire protection equipment (item G of figure 1 of EN 54-1) .

In these cases at least the following shall apply:

- a) it shall be possible to select the feature at access level 3 for individual zones;
- b) the inhibition of one output signal shall not affect the actioning of other outputs.]

[EN54 section 7.11, Delays to outputs (option with requirements - see also 9.4.2.c) and annex E)

The control and indicating may have provision to delay the actioning of outputs to fire alarm devices (item C of figure 1 of EN 54-1) and/or to fire alarm routing equipment (item E of figure 1 of EN 54-1). In these cases at least the following shall apply:

- a) the operation of delays to outputs to C shall be selectable at access level 3 to apply to
 - fire detectors, and/or;
 - manual call points, and/or;
 - signals from specific zones;
- b) the operation of delays to outputs to E shall be selectable at access level 3, to apply to
 - fire detectors, and/or;
 - signals from specific zones.
- c) the delay times shall be configurable at access level 3, in increments not exceeding 1 minute, up to a maximum of 10 minutes;
- d) it shall be possible to override the delays and immediately action delayed outputs by means of a manual operation at access level 1 and/or by means of a signal from a manual call point;
- e) the delay to one output signal shall not affect the actioning of other outputs.]

3.3 SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS

It is recommended that safety critical process inputs be measured using redundant input sensors.



Some applications may require multiple sensors and I/O points per safety function

In safety critical input applications using a single sensor, it is important that the sensor failure modes be predictable and well understood, so that there is little probability of a failed sensor not responding to a critical process condition. In such a configuration, it is important that the sensor be tested regularly, either by dynamic process conditions that are verified in the TMR system, or by manual intervention testing.

The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and channel within the system. In many cases, redundant sensor and actuator configurations may be used, or differing sensor and actuator types provide alternate detection and control possibilities. Plant facilities frequently have related signals, e.g. start, and stop signals, in these cases it is important to ensure that failures beyond the system's fault-tolerant capability do not result in either inability to respond safely or in inadvertent operation. In some cases, this will require that channels be allocated on the same module, to ensure that a module failure results in the associated signals failing-safe.

However, in most cases, it will be necessary to separate the signals across modules. Where non-redundant configurations are employed, it is especially important to ensure that the fail-safe action is generated in case of failures within the system.

Field loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to input channels and modules. For normally energised input configurations, field loop power failure will lead to the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may be related functions, e.g. start and stop signals, where loss of field power should be considered in the same manner as the signal allocation. Where signals are powered from separate power groups, it is important that this separation be maintained when allocating the signals to modules, i.e. that they are not connected to input channels within the same power group.

3.4 ACTUATOR CONFIGURATIONS

As with sensor configurations it is recommended that redundant actuator configurations be used for safety-critical applications.



Some applications may require multiple actuators and I/O points per safety function

In safety-critical applications using a single actuator, it is important that the actuator failure modes be predictable and well understood, so that there is little probability of a failed actuator not responding to a critical process condition.

In such a configuration, it is important that the actuator be tested regularly, either by dynamic process conditions that are verified in the TMR system, or by manual intervention testing.

The function of a signal shall be considered when allocating the module and channel within the system. In many cases, redundant actuator configurations may be used, or differing actuator types provide alternate control and mitigation possibilities. Plant facilities frequently have related signals; in these cases it is important to ensure that failures beyond the system's fault-tolerant capability do not result in either an inability to respond to safety demands or in inadvertent operation. In some cases, this will require that channels be allocated on the same module, to ensure that a module failure results in the associated signals failing-safe. However, in most cases, it will be necessary to separate the signals across modules. Where non-redundant configurations are employed, it is especially important to ensure that the fail-safe action is generated in case of failures within the system.

Field loop power should be considered in the allocation of signals to output channels and modules. For normally energised configurations, field loop power failure will lead to the fail-safe reaction. As with the allocation of signals to modules, there may be related functions where loss of field power should be considered in the same manner as the signal allocation. Where signals are powered from separate power groups, it is important that this separation be maintained when allocating the signals to modules, i.e. that inadvertent coupling between power groups, and particularly return paths, are not generated.

3.5 PFD CALCULATIONS

Systems that are configured to meet the needs of IEC 61508 will require the PFD for the safety instrumented functions to be calculated.

For information regarding the calculation for the 8000 system and PFD numbers allocated for the 8000 system please refer to the TUV approved PFD calculation document listed in the approved version list.

3.6 PROCESSOR CONFIGURATION

3.6.1 Timing



The TMR Processor supports a limited set of configuration options; the system will verify many of the configuration options, for example module locations against actual module types. The configuration options include the maximum application program scan time and sleep period between application program scans. **It is important to ensure that the overall application program scan period (scan and sleep periods) be set according to the PST_E .**

3.6.1.1 ISAGRAF_CONFIG Section

Sleep Period (ISA_SLEEP_PERIOD)



This parameter defines the period that the application program should “sleep” between program scans. This parameter works in conjunction with the allowed scan time defined within the **IEC1131 TOOLSET**. The default value for this parameter is zero. This value may be increased to allow higher levels of processing resource to be allocated to other tasks, e.g. external communications. Increasing this parameter will increase the overall scan time. **If this parameter is increased, it is important to ensure that this overall scan time does not result in a response time exceeding that dictated by PST_E .**

The sleep period or the allowed scan time, set in the **IEC1131 TOOLSET**, should be adjusted to free up processing resource for other activities. If the sleep period is set to zero and the application execution to “fast as possible” the system will switch between the necessary activities as required. Allowing a “free” amount of resource reduces the switching, improves overall efficiency for the specific application and results in greater scan period consistency under a range of conditions, rather than a faster scan period, but variable depending on load.

Maximum Scan Period (MAX_SCAN_TIME)



This parameter defines the maximum application scan time. The default setting is 1000ms. If the defined time is exceeded the system will automatically and immediately initiate its overall fail-safe response. **This value should be set to ensure that the overall scan time does not exceed the period dictated by PST_E .**

3.6.1.2 Composite Scan Time Estimation for the Plantguard TMR System

The composite scan time for a Plantguard system represents the time required to read the input data, solve the application logic, and write the output data. This sequence is repeated cyclically for as long as the Plantguard system is executing an application. For details of the scan time see the scan time calculation section of the TMR Processor PD for the 8110 & 8110B module.

3.6.2 Diagnostic Access

The TMR Processor supports comprehensive diagnostic facilities. Some of these facilities have the capability of modifying the system's operation and are therefore password protected, to provide access protection in addition to that afforded by physical access to the system.

The password is defined in the Security section of the system.ini file. The password is encoded and is not readily decodable from the system.ini text file.



A default password is implemented automatically, however it is recommended that a specific password be defined within the system.ini file. It is important that this password be made available only to personnel requiring access to the additional diagnostic capabilities (typically only ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. personnel). If this password is lost, there is no capability of accessing these functions without reconfiguring the system

3.6.3 Configuration File Verification

The system.ini file defines a number of fundamental safety configuration options. It is important to ensure that the correct file is downloaded to the system and that this file represents the correct configuration.



1. **The system.ini file may be created using either the configuration tool or a text editor.**
2. **Once complete, this file should be downloaded to the system.**
3. **The system.ini file shall then be uploaded from the system and checked that it contains the required configuration options. This ensures that no faults have been introduced by the configuration tool, the PC itself, or the down/upload process.**
4. **Following this check the checksum of the file (uploaded with the file) should be recorded, and used to verify that the file has not changed.**

3.7 HIGH DENSITY I/O MODULE CONFIGURATION

3.7.1 Module Characteristics

The High Density I/O range has facilities to allow several of its operating parameters to be adjusted; examples of these include threshold settings, indicator operation, update rates, etc. The configuration settings available for each module type is defined in its corresponding Product Description (PD). In many applications, the parameter's default values will provide the required operation.

These parameters may be adjusted within the system.ini file, which shall be reviewed in a similar manner as other system configuration and programming.

Once the configuration settings for a module have been determined, the checksum for the configuration data may optionally be calculated and entered into the system.ini file with the appropriate command. This provides further protection against configuration setting changes if desired. The checksum can be uploaded from the module, once the settings have been verified for completeness.

3.7.1.1 SYSTEM Section Configuration

The High Density I/O SYSTEM section within the system.ini file allows the internal bus activity, system watchdog and power failure signal and bypass timeouts to be adjusted. These may be adjusted for test and development purposes.

Internal Bus Activity (IMBTO)



The default setting (500ms) for the internal bus activity timeout is appropriate for most applications. This timeout may be adjusted to a shorter period; **the adjusted period shall be shorter than the PST_E less the overall system response time. This setting SHALL NOT be set to zero for operational systems.**

System Watchdog Timeout (WDOGTO)



As with the internal bus activity timeout, it is not normally necessary to adjust this parameter. **This value shall not be adjusted for safety-related applications and shall not be set to zero for operational systems.**

Power Fail Timeout (PWRFAILTO)



The power fail signal timeout shall only be set to zero if the output module is required to change to its configured fail-safe state, rather than off/de-energised in the case of loss of communications with, or removal of the TMR Processor.

Bypass Timeout (BYPASSTO)



The Bypass Timeout period to temporarily bypass the other timeouts defined in the system section during an Active/Standby changeover. Only in exceptional cases will it be necessary to adjust this setting. **This setting shall not be adjusted for safety related systems and shall not be set to zero for operational systems.**

3.7.1.2 FORCE Section



This section allows the reported channel state to be forced directly on the associated input or output module. **This feature is for testing by ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. or an approved systems integrator only, and SHALL NOT to be used in an operational system.**

3.7.1.3 SHUTDOWN Section



This section allows the user to configure individual shutdown states for each output channel. The options include de-energise, energise and hold. **Safety related, de-energise to trip outputs shall either be left to their default shutdown action configuration (de-energise) or specifically configured to de-energise. Safety related, energise to trip outputs should be configured for the energise option.**

3.7.1.4 FLAGS Section



This section allows the user to configure the input or output type and the form of monitoring supported for each channel. **For line monitored, safety-related outputs the logical = TRUE setting shall not be used as this disables the line-monitoring facility.**

3.7.1.5 LED Section



This section allows the user to configure the indicators on the front of each High Density I/O module. LED color and flash attributes can be specified for each possible channel state (such as line fault conditions or voltage threshold ranges) **Safety related I/O shall not use steady green to indicate abnormal channel conditions.**

3.7.1.6 De Energised Short Circuit Detection Section



This section allows the user to enable the de-energised short circuit detection (default is disabled). **Safety related I/O that is normally De-Energised shall use short circuit monitoring (see section 3.2.4).**

3.7.2 Module Replacement Configuration

The system supports 3 forms of High Density I/O module replacement:

- a. Hot-swap pair (companion slot)
- b. SmartSlot
- c. Live insertion and removal

In the hot-swap pair, 2 adjacent module positions are coupled to provide an active and standby module pair. If it is intended that the system be able to start-up (including application stop and re-start), on the primary module position, there is no requirement to define the secondary module position.



If it is intended to allow the system to start with only the secondary module position occupied, it is important that the module positions be included within the system.ini file. Identical configuration settings shall be entered for both primary and secondary module positions.

For SmartSlot pair operation, it is not possible to start-up using the “spare” module position. The spare module position need not be in the same chassis as the primary module position.

If it is intended to perform live insertion and removal without transfer to a standby module no specific configuration is required. If it is intended to start-up a system without the primary module installed in either a SmartSlot or single module live insertion and removal configuration, the “simulate” configuration option should be set. The simulate option will allow the system to start with these modules omitted, the corresponding states and values being set to their fail-safe conditions.



1. **A consistent module replacement philosophy should be used within any single system. Where mixed philosophies are used, there shall be clear indication of the repair approach applicable to each module or group of modules.**
2. **In hot-swap and SmartSlot configurations, the accuracy with both modules installed shall be within the plant required safety accuracy specification. If tighter tolerance is required, ensure that each sensor within a redundant configuration is allocated to independent modules and procedural measures are implemented to ensure that only a single module within this set of modules is paired at any instant.**
3. **If the SmartSlot module replacement is used, the system shall include provision for testing the SmartSlot linking cable. This cable shall be tested before use; the testing of this cable shall be included in the Operating and Maintenance Manual.**
4. **In hot-swap configurations, a secondary module that does not pair with the primary module in a reasonable amount of time (less than the second fault occurrence time) must be removed.**
5. **In SmartSlot configurations, a secondary module that does not pair with the primary module in a reasonable amount of time (less than the second fault occurrence time) when the SmartSlot linking cable is installed must be removed.**

3.8 INPUT AND OUTPUT FORCING

Locking and forcing of individual inputs and outputs from the IEC1131 Workbench are supported for engineering, installation and commissioning purposes. In-service, maintenance overrides for safety-related inputs and outputs should be implemented using the application program. The IEC1131 Workbench initiated locking and forcing requires:

- The TMR Processor keyswitch to be in the “Maintain” position to make changes to the lock or force status of any point
- Access to the workbench lock & write commands, which are multi-level password protected.
- A list of the currently locked points are read back from the TMR system and made available within the IEC1131 Workbench

The TMR Processor inhibit LED will indicate when one or more I/O points are locked. The application program can determine how many points are currently locked by used the information available from the TMR Processor complex equipment; it is highly recommended that this be used to control additional status display and/or for logging purposes.



All input and output locks (and forces) can be removed using either a single function from the IEC1131 Workbench or from an edge triggered signal to the TMR Processor board within the application program. If locking is used, a safety-related input connected to an operator accessible switch shall be implemented to initiate the removal of the lock and force conditions.

It is important that the effects of forcing input and output points on the process and their safety impact are understood by any person using these facilities.



The system will allow the forced conditions to be maintained during normal operation. **When returning to normal operation it is recommended that all locked and forced points be returned to normal operation.** It is the plant operators' responsibility to ensure that if forced conditions are present that they do not jeopardise the functional safety.

3.9 MAINTENANCE OVERRIDES

Maintenance Overrides set inputs or outputs to a defined state that can be different from the real state during safety operation. It is used during maintenance, usually to override input or output conditions in order to perform a periodic test, calibration, or repair of a module, sensor or actuator.

To correctly implement a maintenance override scheme within the TMR Controller the override, or 'bypass' logic shall be programmed within the Application Program, with a separate set of safety-related input points or variables enabling the bypass logic.



In order to accommodate maintenance overrides safely, TÜV has documented a set of principles that shall be followed. These principles are published in the document "Maintenance Override" by TÜV Süddeutschland / TÜV Product Service GmbH and TÜV Rheinland.

There are two basic methods now used to check safety-related peripherals connected to the TMR system:

1. Special switches connected to conventional system inputs. These inputs are used to deactivate sensors and actuators during maintenance. The maintenance condition is handled as part of the system's application program.
2. Sensors and actuators are electrically switched off during maintenance and are checked manually.

In some installations, the maintenance console may be integrated with the operator display, or maintenance may be covered by other strategies. In such installations, the guidance given in para. 3.11.5 is to be followed. A checklist for the application of overrides is given in para. 4.2.3.

3.10 PEER COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION

Peer Communications allows safety-relevant data to pass between numbers of 8000 series TMR systems. When using this mechanism, as with any other, it is important to ensure that the overall system will respond within the required PST_E . This requirement applies to normal operation and in the presence of faults.

For safety-related applications, it is recommended that the Peer-to-Peer Communications I use redundant networks. Different systems shall be defined as Peer-to-Peer 'master' on each network. For safety-related applications, the Peer Networks shall be dedicated networks, shall not be used for other purposes and shall not include bridges to other networks.

The Peer-to-Peer Input boards include the configuration of a refresh timeout. This timeout defines the maximum interval between the receipts of valid, updated data from an associated (source) system. **This timeout period shall be set that if the fault tolerant capabilities of the Peer-to-Peer Network, (i.e. lack of fresh data is detected) the system can still respond within the required PST_E . The network propagation time must be included in the timeout period calculations, and should be re-verified after each change to the network configuration.**



The freshness of the received data is available to the application programmer as part of the Peer-to-Peer Input board input information. This status is set to 'TRUE' or '1' whilst updated data is received within the refresh timeout. If a timeout occurs, this status bit is set to '0'. The data received from the corresponding source system will be held in its previous state or value in the case of a timeout. **It is important that the application programmer include handling of this condition, including latching of the failure as necessary.** For example, the loss of the Peer-to-Peer Communications link may require a specific safety reaction, or may require that the corresponding data be set to a specific states or value.



The Peer-to-Peer Output board includes a refresh period. This value defines the interval between transmissions of the corresponding data if no state or value changes are received from the local application program. This value shall be set to a period shorter than that of the input board, unless changes occur constantly, otherwise the corresponding input boards will timeout.

The Peer-to-Peer master configuration includes transmit timeout values for that network. The Peer-to-Peer master and slave configurations include response timeout values. These values are used to determine the link status. This link status information may be used in addition to the freshness status to allow the source system, or Peer-to-Peer Communications master to report link status or to act in the event of link failure.

3.11 APPLICATION PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The IEC1131 Workbench may be connected either directly to the serial communications ports local to the TMR Processor or via an Ethernet network. **Where Ethernet is used, the network shall not be used to connect equipment not associated with the TMR system. PCs connected to this network shall not provide a route to access the TMR system from other networks, i.e. if they support multiple Ethernets, routing to the dedicated TMR system network shall be specifically disabled.**



3.11.1 IEC1131 Workbench Configuration

The IEC1131 workbench supports 16 levels of password access, level 0 being the highest access level. Each workbench function (for example, viewing, editing, compiling, downloading) may be identified for use only by users with an access level above a certain level.

User access passwords shall be implemented, the recommended access levels are:



- 0 – Engineering supervisor**
- 2 – Engineer/Application Programmer**
- 4 – Maintenance Engineer**
- 8 – General User**

With the functions allocated as shown in Table 8.

Function	Min. access level	Function	Min. access level
Global Protection	0	Debug application	8
Overwrite with archive	2	Simulate application	8
Backup on archive	8	Download/stop/start application	4
Project Description	4	Update application	4
History of modifications	8	Communications parameters	8
I/O Connection	2	Set cycle time	2
Global Variables	2	Set execution mode	2
Global & Common Defined Words	2	Change variable state	4
Create New	2	Lock/Unlock variable	4
Move program in hierarchy	2	Control SFC	4
Verify	8	Control Timer	4
Make application code	4	Set IL Breakpoint	4
Touch application	4	Set SFC Breakpoint	4
Conversion tables	2	Create graphics	8
Application runtime parameters	2	List of variables	8
Compiler options	2	List of time diagrams	8
Resource definition	2	Print project document	8
		Customise project document	4

Table 8 - IEC1131 Workbench Recommended Access Levels

3.11.2 Language Selection

The **IEC1131 TOOLSET** offers many programming tools to develop algorithms to meet the needs of virtually any real-time control application. The configuration and programming languages approved for use in SIL 3 or AK6 safety related application is shown in Table 9.

Safety Related	Function Block (FB)
	Instruction List (IL)
	Structured Text (ST)
	Ladder Diagrams (LD)
Non-Safety	Sequential Function Chart (SFC)
	'C'

Table 9 - Safety Related Programming Language

- **Safety Related Languages.** For those languages that have been classified as 'safety related'. Commonly used functions have been exhaustively tested and may be used freely. Those included within the certification testing are shown in para. 5. Further functions may be used subject to completion of testing commensurate with the level used for the commonly used functions.
- **Non-Safety.** The languages that have been classified for non-safety related application only shall NOT be used within a safety-related system.



IL and ST include program flow control functions; these functions shall be used with caution to ensure that infinite loop or omitted logic conditions do not result. **Where these constructs are used, it is recommended that full branch and data coverage tests be performed on these sections of program. It is recommended that only Boolean conditions be used for these constructs to ensure that a feasible set of tests can be applied.**



Application programmer generated function blocks may be created either on a project specific or library basis. **Where these functions are to be used for safety-related applications, they shall be subject to exhaustive testing, commensurate with that used for the commonly used functions (see para. 3.11.3).** Once the function block has been subject to this level of testing it may be used as for commonly used functions.

There is provision for the TMR system to support multiple programs within a project. A complete project may be classified as safety or non-safety related. A safety-related project may use the safety programming languages; non-safety programming languages cannot be used. A project classified as non-safety may use any of the programming languages and the full instruction set but shall not be used to implement safety related functions. A checklist for the selection of programming languages is given in para. 4.2.2.

3.11.3 Testing of New or Previously Untested Functions



The TMR system Tool set comprises a number of function blocks that can be combined together to form a project application. **The use of these function blocks in safety certified systems is only permitted once they have been tested for correct operation.** A list of the functions tested prior to the initial certification the TMR system is provided in section 5 of this Manual.

The new or previously untested function may be:

- a generic function block, which forms part of the Toolset, but has not previously been subject to the level of testing defined herein, or
- project specific function block, which is written to meet the needs of a particular feature within an application program, and may comprise a number of generic function blocks or other program functions

If a previously untested function block is needed, the function block must be tested in accordance with 3.11.3.1 to 3.11.3.7.

3.11.3.1 Test Method

Each function to be tested shall be placed within an application test harness using the TMR system Toolset that exercises its capabilities. The implementation of this harness shall be such that the function block is exercised automatically, so that the test is repeatable.

As a minimum each test harness shall comprise of all of the following:

- Function Block under test
- Alternative implementation of the function block
- Function generator
- Main and alternative comparison Pass/Fail Flag
- Test results register

Where practical, and with the exception of time, results of the test shall be automatically recorded and should not require a human to count or record dynamic data.

3.11.3.2 Alternative Implementation of the Function Block

The test harness shall include an alternative implementation of the function being tested. This implementation shall be performed using features of the tool set that are as diverse as possible from the actual function block.

For example an "Or Gate" can be simulated by counting the number of inputs set to a logical "1" and determining that the count is greater than or equal to 1.

3.11.3.3 Function Generator

The operation of the test harness shall be automatic; a function generator shall be provided to generate the stimuli for the function under test. This function generator shall be as simple as possible and shall not contain the function under test.

3.11.3.4 Main and Alternative Comparison Pass/Fail Flag

The results of the alternative implementation shall be compared with the results of the function under test; discrepancies shall cause a "main and alternative comparison fail flag" to be set.

3.11.3.5 Test Results Register

Each harness shall include registers that record the functionality of the function block. This registration should be as comprehensive as possible and should utilise as many predictable features as possible.

For example, a 2 input logical "Or Gate" stimulated by the two lower bits of a 16-bit counter will record 32768 logical high states if the counter is allowed to make one complete up count from 0 to 65536. The results register would count these states and present a number to the human operator. In this case the results register should also record that no two consecutive states of the counter caused a logical "1" at the output of the Gate.

3.11.3.6 Test Coverage

Where possible, all combinations of input shall be simulated.

For certain functions, such as adders and comparators, this is not practical. In these cases, the test harness shall utilise a significant number of test cases to prove the functions operation. The use equivalence class, boundary cases and random numbers shall be used as the preferred method of generating these cases.

Functions containing complex algorithms or with extensive retained state or value dependence require an extensive number of test cases, and are therefore considered impractical to achieve a sufficient level of test coverage and shall be used in non-safety programs only.

3.11.3.7 Recording and Filing of Results

The tests shall utilise formally approved test procedures and the test results shall be formally recorded. The test harness, details of the test environment and test result shall be retained.

Any deviation between the results and expected results shall be examined; where this results from deficiencies in the test harness these shall be corrected and the test repeated. Should any function fail it shall be:

- Not used within safety related applications, or
- The conditions that result in erroneous operation shall be explicitly recorded and published. If the function is used, other function(s) shall be added to the application to specifically detect the conditions leading to erroneous operation and take a fail-safe action.

To maintain system certification, any test harness used to prove a function block should be archived as part of the test record so that the tests can be repeated at later date and if required, reviewed by TÜV.

3.11.4 Application Development

The application program development shall follow a structured approach and follow the principles defined in para. 2.2.1.5. The stages defined in the following sub-sections shall additionally be applied for safety related applications.

3.11.4.1 Partitioning the Application

It is impractical and unnecessary to apply the same degree of rigorous development and testing to all functions within the Application where some of those functions are not safety related.

The identification of safety functions is, in part, dependent on the specific safety philosophy. Examples of non-safety may include status indication, data reporting and sequence of events. It is important to establish that these elements are not safety related. For example, some safety cases rely on human intervention and therefore the correct operation of status indication.



The safety related elements shall be implemented within separate programs to those of non-safety related elements. Where information passes between these elements, it shall be arranged that the direction of flow is from safety relevant to non-safety relevant only.

3.11.4.2 Defensive Measures

In defining the Application the programmer must consider the potential sources of error and apply reasonable defensive programming techniques. Where values are received from other programs or external communications interfaces, the validity of the values should be checked where possible. Similarly, values received from input interfaces should be checked where possible. In many cases, it will also be possible to monitor permutations of data, inputs and plant operating modes to establish the plausibility of the information and program measures to ensure safe responses in case of implausible conditions.



Safety related functions shall be latched when in their tripped state to prevent intermittent field faults from removing the trip condition. The application software shall be written to ensure that safety related functions are in their safe state during system startup.

3.11.4.3 Testable Blocks

Each safety-related software block shall be 100% testable. A 100% testable block is the application logic that belongs to one safety function. Such functions could be:

- Burner flame supervision including temperature, air/gas pressure monitoring, etc.
- Burner gas-to-air ration control/supervision
- Parts or whole of the start-up sequence of a batch reactor

The fewer the number of inputs, outputs and signal paths, the fewer the number of permutations that require testing. However, a single safety function should not be split into separate blocks; such a division is likely to lead to the introduction of errors during maintenance activities.

The interaction between the individual software blocks shall be minimised. Where interaction is necessary, it should be kept as simple as possible, for example a single shutdown initiation signal.

Each safety function shall be responsible for the control of the corresponding outputs. Sharing of outputs between functions shall not be permitted.

3.11.4.4 Individual Safety Related Functions

The TMR system **IEC1131 TOOLSET** allows the definition of up to 250 individual programs within a single project. This facility should be exploited to enable the allocation of individual safety related functions to separate programs. Where such programs contain independent logic paths, these should be investigated to determine if they are separate safety functions. Where they are separate, it is recommended that these be further allocated to their own program, subject to conforming to the recommendation to minimising the coupling between programs.

Cases should be looked for that allows the creation of individual logic paths by repeating small sections of logic rather than fanning out the resultant signal(s).

3.11.4.5 Minimise Logic Depth

Where possible, the logic depth should be minimised. This helps reduce visual complexity, simplifies testing, minimises the number of interconnects required and improves program efficiency.

Where there is nested logic, it shall be possible to establish the correct operation of all intermediate logic connections.

The use of memory, i.e. latches, components within the safety function shall be minimised. Similarly, the permutation of conditions that lead to their activation shall be minimised.

3.11.5 Communications Interaction

The TMR system provides a range of communications options to allow interaction with external systems. Where this communication is used for reporting (or out-going) communications, there are no specific safety requirements.

Data received from external equipment that either controls safety-related functions or affects their operation must be handled with caution. The Application Program shall handle the received data.

The received data should be such that it is limited to interaction which:

- Initiates safety operations, i.e. initiates shutdown sequences
- Resets signals, with the reset action only possible once the initiating conditions have been removed
- Initiate timed start-up override signals which are removed automatically either on expiration of the start period or once the associated signal has stabilised in the normal operating condition
- Adjust control parameters within defined safe operational limits, i.e. lowering of trip thresholds.

Where the interaction does not fall within these categories, the affects of incorrect values and sequences of values shall be considered and measures taken to ensure that the system will respond safely in the event of erroneous data. Alternatively, measures may be implemented within the application to ensure the integrity and validity of the data.

3.11.6 Program Testing

Even with a small number of inputs, it is possible to reach a point where the number of tests becomes unreasonable. Eliminating impossible or unlikely scenarios should be used to reduce the number of logic path tests that need to be performed. The selection of what constitutes a scenario that does not require testing can be performed only after a suitable hazard analysis.

The scenarios should include possible plant conditions, sequences of plant conditions, system conditions (including partial power conditions, module removal and fault conditions).

Where it is not possible to define a representative suite of test cases, all permutations of input conditions, i.e. all possible states on all possible inputs, shall be exercised. Where the logic includes memory or timing elements, additional tests shall be defined to exercise all the possible sequences of input permutations leading to their operation.



All safety-related functions shall be tested and the results of the tests recorded. The tests shall include the system scan time, fault detection time, fault reaction time and throughput delay for shutdown logic. The system scan time, including Peer-to-Peer Communications where appropriate, shall be less than $\frac{1}{2}$ PST_E.



Functional testing of all safety related programs is considered to be 100% if:

- All inputs are exercised through their entire allowable range
- All outputs are exercised through their entire program determined range
- All logic paths are exercised
- All timers have been tested regarding their timing characteristics without changing timing parameters
- All combinatorial permutations of digital signals, with the exception of 100% tested function blocks, are tested, including fault states.
- All combinatorial permutations of analogue signals, with the exception of 100% tested function blocks, are tested within the safety accuracy granularity.
- All timing properties of each safety loop have been verified

3.11.6.1 Cross Reference Checking

While the aim shall be to minimise the coupling and dependencies between individual programs, there will inevitably be occasions where, for example, a variable is used within two or more programs. It is important to ensure that any application program changes that affect these interactions do not jeopardise the functional safety.



The TMR system Toolset includes two cross-reference check tools. One of these verifies the source cross-references, the other the compiled code cross-references. **Once the application program baseline has been established, these tools shall be used following application modification. The identified interdependent programs shall then be re-tested. Whenever a program modifies a shared variable all programs that use that same variable shall be re-tested.**

3.11.6.2 Code Comparison



After each phase of modification to the application as a whole, the TMR system code comparison and run-time code version checker utilities shall be used to identify those programs that have changed. Any program identified as having undergone change, other than compiled variable addresses, shall be re-tested.

After an application has been tested, and before any changes are made, a reference copy of the compiled application should be made. After the application has been modified, the new application is compared to the original application by using the TicDiff utility. The utility will identify those programs that have changed since the original application and are subject to re-test.

The TicVer utility is used to ensure that the reference copy of the original application is the same as the application currently loaded into the TMR system.

3.12 ON-LINE MODIFICATION

As with any safety related system it is highly recommended that on-line changes not be performed. Where changes have to be performed on-line, it is recommended that they be performed when alternative safety measures are provided or when the affected hazards cannot arise.

Certain modifications can be performed without directly affecting the system's safety function, for example the installation of additional modules. Although these modifications will not affect the system's operation until the system configuration and application program have been modified, caution shall be exercised to ensure that the modifications do not affect other safety functions.

The product allows for the on-line addition of modules, although these require application program modification, which dictates the stop and reload of the application. The addition of modules may be performed on-line to minimise the period of plant downtime. Modifications to field and power wiring to accommodate new modules shall be considered carefully. **Changes that affect the system's ability to respond safely, or may cause other plant disruption shall not be performed on-line unless alternate protection measures can be implemented for the duration of such modifications.**



3.12.1 Application Program

The Plantguard system supports two types of on-line updates: Normal Updates and Intelligent Updates. Specifically, an on-line update consists of changing the currently running application, loading those changes into the system, then having the system "switch" to the updated application without interruption to the process that the application is controlling. Normal updates are available in all released versions of the Plantguard system.

With Normal Updates, the TMR system allows limited changes to be made to the application program on-line. These pre-defined limits restrict changes to logical operation. Modifications that exceed these predefined limits automatically preclude on-line modification and dictate that the application program be stopped before updating.

In addition to Normal Updates, Intelligent Updates are supported in release 3.4 and above. Both on-line update features enable the user to modify the application while the process is running. While both types of on-line updates perform essentially the same function, Intelligent Updates allow the application to be modified in a number of ways that Normal Updates would not allow.

If Intelligent Updates are to be used they must be explicitly enabled for each project, and the Intelligent Update Manager must have knowledge of the specific version of the application that is currently running in the controller. Each time an application is compiled, the Intelligent Update Manager uses its knowledge of the application running in the controller to create an Intelligent Update recipe. This recipe contains a signature of the application running in the target, and information on how to perform specific mapping for variables and function block instance data. It is the recipe that allows the value of variables and function block instance data to be preserved across an on-line update. **The Intelligent Update Enhancement section of 8082B Product Description (PD) must be read and understood before Intelligent Update is used.**

The existing application program must be archived before any changes to the application are carried out.

Where it is necessary to perform on-line modifications, caution shall be taken to ensure that unsafe responses are not generated. Particular consideration shall be given to the effects during the transition between the existing and the new programs and configurations. This is particularly important where a number of interacting systems provide the required safety functions.



Before any revised application program is downloaded to an on-line system:

- **All changes shall be tested using the application simulator**
- **The cross-reference checkers (see para. 3.11.6.1) shall be used and programs using data from modified programs shall be re-tested.**
- **The source code compare utility (see para. 3.11.6.2) shall be used; any programs identified as having other than compiled variable addresses shall be re-tested.**



Once testing has been successfully completed, the application program may be downloaded to the TMR Processor. **The download and application update may only be performed with the TMR Processor keyswitch in the 'Maintain' position.**

3.12.2 System Configuration

All modifications to the system configuration (system.ini file) shall be subject to the same considerations as specified earlier in this Manual. The configuration file may be up- or downloaded to the system when the TMR Processor keyswitch is in the Maintain position. High Density I/O configuration changes then require that the application program be stopped and re-started to bring the changes on-line.

Modification to the system configuration normally entails the addition or deletion of input and output points. If these points previously did not exist within the application program, it will be necessary to take the system off-line to perform the changes.

Basic system parameters, including the number of chassis, chassis mapping, communications settings etc., require that the TMR Processor be removed and re-installed, or the power cycled to the controller chassis to implement the configuration changes.

The existing system configuration (system.ini) must be archived before any changes to the system configuration are carried out.

Where changes to the system configuration are anticipated it is necessary to include the "spare" module positions and chassis within the existing system.ini file.

3.13 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS



The system installation environment presents a potential source of common cause failure. **It is necessary to ensure that the equipment is suitable for the intended environment. Alternatively, methods of maintaining the equipment's environmental conditions within its capabilities should be provided. This is applicable to all systems; the remainder of this section however gives the specific environmental recommendations for a TMR system.**

3.13.1 Climatic Conditions

The recommended and maximum climatic conditions for the equipment are shown in the Table 10. These conditions apply for representative and typical system configurations. Where high equipment densities are accommodated within a system or large quantities of high-power equipment are closely packed, it is necessary to

consider the localised heat generation and its impact on the overall system operating environmental conditions.

Table 10 defines the climatic conditions for a system as a whole. It is possible to achieve a system capable of operation in a wider range of climatic conditions using detailed analysis of the characteristics of the system and resultant conditions for the equipment mounted within the system.

It should be noted that the operating temperature for the equipment within any electronic system has a significant impact on the potential operating life of that equipment. High operating temperature and rates of temperature change significantly reduce the operational life of any electronic device; therefore, measures should be taken to ensuring that the operating environment remains within the recommended range. Similarly, it is highly recommended that the periods that the equipment is exposed to conditions outside the recommended range be minimised.

Parameter	Comment	Recommended		Limit	
		Min	Max	Min	Max
Operating Temperature (dry)	With natural cooling	10°C	30°C	0°C	40°C
		50°F	86°F	32°F	104°F
	With forced airflow	10°C	30°C	-20°C	50°C
		50°F	86°F	-4°F	122°F
Storage Temperature (dry)		10°C	30°C	-25°C	70°C
		50°F	86°F	-13°F	158°F
Operating Humidity	Non-condensing			5%RH	95%RH
Storage Humidity	Non-condensing			5%RH	95%RH
Temperature change			0.5°C/min		See Note
			1°F/min		

Table 10 - Climatic Condition Requirements

Note: Although there is no defined maximum, it is important to avoid changes of humidity and temperature that could produce condensation. The effects of condensation on any type of electrical equipment can result in equipment failures or improper operation.

3.13.2 Electro-Magnetic Compatibility (EMC)

The TMR system has been designed and tested to withstand normal levels of conducted and radiated electromagnetic interference and electrostatic discharge. Electrical noise conditions may vary greatly, depending on the equipment installation, wiring, other installed equipment, and its proximity to the TMR equipment. A detailed analysis of the installation electrical and magnetic conditions is rare. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the system as a whole complies with the client's requirements or appropriate standards; within Europe, the CE mark requirements form a legal minimum. For systems for applications outside Europe it is recommended that at least the same measures be applied, and confirmation sought from the client or end-user that electromagnetic interference (EMI) levels shall not exceed of those shown in Table 11.

Parameter	Conditions	Notes
Electrostatic Discharge	15kV air discharge 8kV contact discharge	Contact is direct to equipment
Electromagnetic Field	10V/m 23MHz to 1GHz	
Conducted Noise/ Fast Transient Immunity Test (Burst)	2kV test voltage – power supplies 1kV test voltage – digital I/O (\geq 24V) 0.25kV test voltage – digital (<24V), analogue and communication I/O	On system external connection (e.g. terminals)

Table 11 - Electromagnetic Compatibility

If the anticipated EMI exceed these levels, additional protection measures shall be applied.

3.13.2.1 Shield Installation

In the event of system maintenance and during commissioning it is highly likely that the system will have its doors open for significant periods. The overall cabinet forms part of the systems EMC protection, and therefore it is particularly important that during these periods the intended internal protection methods be in place. The TMR system modules, together with their chassis, form part of the system's internal EMC protection. Therefore, all empty module positions within the system shall be fitted with shields.

3.13.2.2 EMI Earthing

Terminals provide additional high frequency (EMI) earthing between multiple chassis in a single system.

There are two methods that can be used for EMI earthing:

1. The earth terminal on each chassis in the local system should be connected to a single-point earth (such as a bolt on the cabinet) using a 13mm (0.5 inch) earth braid soldered to a ring lug.
2. Alternatively, the earth braid can be connected between the chassis earth terminal and the equipment mounting rails. This method is acceptable only if all

the TMR equipment is located in a single cabinet or in multiple cabinets that are joined together.

3.13.3 Electrostatic Handling Precautions

The following handling precautions shall also be observed:

1. Personnel should earth themselves before handling modules.
2. Modules should not be handled by their connectors.
3. Do not remove modules from their packaging until required for use.

3.14 SYSTEM POWER REQUIREMENTS

The system's power supplies and distribution, if incorrectly designed, present a potential common cause failure. It is therefore necessary to:

- Establish the power philosophy, specific earthing philosophy⁴, required voltage and power requirements, and the separation requirements where items of equipment are separately supplied, e.g. system internal supplies and field loop supplies.
- Define the architecture of the Power Supply Units (PSU), e.g. 100% redundancy, dual N+1 redundancy, etc. and ensure that each power source is of adequate capability.
- Ensure that the PSUs are compatible with the power feeds provided. Alternatively, measures should be implemented to ensure that the PSU power feeds remain within the PSU specifications.
- Define the power distribution requirements, together with the protective philosophy for each distribution, e.g. current limited at source or protective devices. Where protective devices are used, it is important to establish that the sufficient current be available to ensure their protective action and that the protective device can break the maximum prospective fault current.
- Ensure that the power distribution media is sized to accommodate the maximum prospective fault currents and tolerable voltage losses. This is specifically important where floating supplies are employed and other power sources may result in high prospective fault currents in the event of multiple earth-fault conditions.

The system modules require two 24V dc power feeds, with a common return path, i.e. the 24V return is common between the power feeds.

Where other than 8000 series power supplies are used, they shall conform to IEC1131 Part 2, EN61010-1 or EN 60950.



⁴ ICS Triplex Technology Ltd. recommends that the negative side of the field supply be connected to earth (ground). This will avoid possible fail danger conditions that can be caused by some earth fault monitors used with floating power supplies.

4. CHECKLISTS

This section provides a number of example checklists, these are provided as an aid for competent engineers. In general each checklist item should result in “yes”, where this is not the case a justification should be produced.

4.1 PRE-ENGINEERING CHECKLISTS

The checklists provided within this section are applicable to the requirements. It should be recognised that the requirements will undergo refinement, particularly, in the early stages of a project. The information provided initially may be ‘outline’; in this case these checklists should be used to help identify where omission has occurred or where further refinement is necessary.

4.1.1 Scope Definition Checklist

Description	Reference	
Has a summary description of the intended application been provided?	2.2.1.1	
Is the intended installation environment defined? If so: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does this include both normal and possible abnormal conditions? • does this include geographical distribution requirements? 	2.2.1.1 and 3.13	
Has a list of all the third-party equipment interfaces been provided and are definitions of both the protocol and the data to be interchanged established?	2.2.1.1	
Are all of the plant interfaces defined, including the signal qualities and characteristics?	2.2.1.1	
Have any special or abnormal conditions that exceed the normal equipment capabilities been highlighted to enable special measure to be implemented?	2.2.1.1	
Is the presented information adequate to support the necessary level of understanding of the plant/EUC and its environment?	2.2.1.1	

4.1.2 Functional Requirements Checklist

Description	Reference	
Is the definition of each of the required functions complete?	2.2.1.2	
Are the interfaces, signals, and data associated with each function clearly identified?	2.2.1.2	
Where a 'tag referencing' scheme is used for these signals, has a summary description of the naming convention been provided to facilitate an understanding of the role of the signal?	2.2.1.2	
Have the performance requirements for each function, or collective functions, been defined?	2.2.1.2	
Have the operating modes of the EUC, process or plant been clearly defined?	2.2.1.2	
Have the functions required to operate in each plant operating-mode been identified?	2.2.1.2	
Have the transitions between each plant operating-mode been defined? Have the functions necessary to effect these transitions been established?	2.2.1.2	

4.1.3 Safety Requirements Checklist

Description	Reference	
Have all of the functional requirements been allocated a required safety requirements class?	2.2.1.3	
Has the safety-related timing for each safety-related function, including process safety time (PST) and fault tolerance period, been established?	2.2.1.3	
Have the safety requirements been approved?	2.2.1.3	
Are there clear definitions of the external interfaces involved in each of the safety-related functions? (These may already be defined in the functional requirements).	2.2.1.3	
Is there now sufficient information to understand how the plant should be controlled safely in each of its intended operating modes?		

4.2 ENGINEERING CHECKLISTS

4.2.1 I/O Architecture Checklist

Description	Reference	
Has the PST_E been established?	1.3.3 and 2.2.1.3	
What is the PST_E ?		
Has the fault detection time for the system been established?	3.2.2 and 0	
What is the fault detection time?		
Where the fault detection time is greater than the PST_E , does the safety-related I/O configuration provide a fail-safe configuration? If not, the system topology shall be discussed with the client to ensure that the system implementation is safe.		
If a probability of failure on demand has been specified, has this been met?		
Do the selected architectures provide solutions where there is no single power source or distribution point of failure that could lead the system to fail to function safely when required?	3.14	
Have sensor fault conditions been taken into account?	3.3	
For each of the I/O signal types, do the I/O modules provide the correct characteristics and behaviour for the intended sensor or actuator (including minimum and maximum load requirements)? If not, have additional interfacing elements been included to ensure that the effective signal is compatible with the selected module type?		
Are the selected I/O module types compatible with the required I/O architecture?	3.2.1	
Is the safety-accuracy adequate for the application? If active and standby modules are to be installed simultaneous, has allowance been included for the effect on the accuracy?	3.2.3	

Description	Reference	
<p>Has the allocation of signals to I/O modules and channels considered each of the signals' function? Ensure that potential module and power group failures result in either continued safety function or fail-safe operation.</p>	3.2.1	
<p>Do safety-related inputs and outputs use only those configurations identified as safety related?</p>	3.2.1	
<p>Are there any safety-related, normally de-energised outputs? If so have redundant power sources, power failure warning and line monitoring been provided?</p>	3.2.4	
<p>Have sensor fault conditions been taken into account?</p>	3.3	
<p>Have actuator fault conditions been taken into account?</p>	3.4	
<p>Have field power supplies conforming to EN6101-1 or EN 60950 been used?</p>	3.14	

4.2.2 Language Selection Checklist

Description	Reference	
<p>Has application programming for safety-related sections been limited to the FB programming language?</p>	3.11.2	
<p>Are any functions not in the previously tested libraries required? If so has provision been made to adequately test these functions?</p>	3.11.3	
<p>Ensure that the programming languages classified as non-safety ('C' and SFC) are NOT used for safety-related projects</p>	3.11.2	

4.2.3 Override Requirements Checklist

Description	Reference	
Are the effects of overriding fully understood, particularly where the override action will affect independent parts of an application?	3.9	
Has a method of enabling, or more importantly removing, the overrides for the system as whole, or individual sub-systems, been provided?	3.9	
Have programming or procedural measures been defined to ensure that no more than a single override may be applied to a given safety-related process unit?	3.9	
Have indication of the presence of override conditions and recording their application and removal been defined?	3.9	
Is there an alternative method of removing an override?	3.9	
Are there programming or procedural measures to limit the period of override?	3.9	

4.2.4 High Density Module Configuration Checklist

Description	Reference	
For each of the I/O signal types, do the I/O module settings provide the correct characteristics and behaviour for the intended sensor or actuator?	3.7.1	
Have the thresholds been verified with both increasing and decreasing field signal levels and with margins to allow for the accuracy and calibration to ensure that they do not result in overlapping bands?	3.7.1	
Is consistent use made of front panel indicators? Ensure that "green" is not used for abnormal conditions.	3.7.1	
Have the update rates been set such that they are acceptable for fault annunciation requirements and that the rates result in the system's response within the PST_E .	3.7.1	
Have the settings been defined according to a field device type setting, and minimal use has been made of channel specific settings?	3.7.1	
For any non-standard configuration settings, have tests been defined and executed to 100% test the required operation?	3.7.1	

4.2.5 Processor and Other Configuration

Description	Reference	
If Peer-to-Peer communications is used, are the timeouts set to ensure a response time less than that required by PST_E ?	3.10	
Has the diagnostic access password been set?	3.6.2	
Password:		
Has the security has been set up on the IEC1131 TOOLSET?	3.11.1	
Engineering supervisor password		
Engineer/ Application programmer password		
Maintenance engineer password		
General user password		

4.2.6 Testing

Description	Reference	
Have all of the functions used been fully tested?	3.11.2 and 3.11.3	
Has the program been fully tested? The code checker can be used to highlight which programs have changed during modification - see para. 3.9.12.2.	3.11.6	
Record the application scan time (read from the Toolset display)		
Record the system throughput time (output SOE – input SOE)		
Record the system throughput time where Peer-to-Peer communications is required (output SOE – input SOE)		
Are the scan and response times in accordance with the PSTE requirements ($< \frac{1}{2} \text{ PST}_E$)?		
Have the climatic conditions been verified to be suitable?	3.13	

5. PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED FUNCTIONS

The following list shows those function blocks that have been proven safe to use in Certified systems.

Boolean	
(>=1)	Logical Or (2 to 16 inputs)
(&)	Logical And (2 to 16 inputs)
()	Inverted Line (Boolean inversion)
(=1)	Exclusive Or
(RS)	Reset dominant Latch
(SR)	Set dominant latch
(ftrig)	Falling edge detection
(rtrig)	Rising edge detection

Timers	
(TON)	Timer delay on
(TOF)	Timer delay off
Counting	
(CTU)	Counter

Comparison Tests	
(>=)	Greater than or Equal to
(<=)	Less than or Equal to
(=)	Equal to
(>)	Greater than.

Arithmetic	
(+)	Add (2 to 16 inputs)

Logic	
(And Mask.)	And Mask
Signal Generation	
(sig_gen)	Function Generator

Data Manipulation	
(sel)	Binary selector (Selects one of 2 integer variables)
(MOD)	Modulo

Register Control	
(SHR)	Shift Right

Data Conversion	
(Boo)	Converts any variable to a Boolean
(Ana)	Converts any variable to an Integer
(Tmr)	Converts a variable for use by a timer

Triplex Technology Ltd. specific function blocks	
(Pack 16)	Packs 16 Boolean values into one word
(Unpack 16)	Unpacks 1 word into 16 Boolean values
(INGAS)	Provides facilities for Analogue input of Gas levels

APPENDIX A

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Table 12 – Intentionally blank

Table 13 – Intentionally blank

Figure 5 – Intentionally blank

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APPENDIX B

7. TRIGUARD I/O

The Triguard I/O modules provide internal TMR interfacing. Other elements of individual modules may be non-redundant (depending on module type) to support 'slice redundancy' in redundant module configurations. To optimise the system's safety availability, the self-test functions are timed to take only a small part of the system resources.

The test interval (TI) to ensure the system's ability to respond to latent errors within the process safety time is given by:

$$TI = 20 \times IOU \times I/O$$

Where:

TI	=	test interval in seconds
IOU	=	number of Triguard I/O chassis
I/O	=	number of I/O modules in a chassis

7.1.1 Effect of Input States

If the three basic Triguard input states and the effect of the fault detection time are considered, then:

1. For a simplex input configuration (used in non-SIL applications), the logic signal into the application will remain at the state prior to detection. This is not fault tolerant and does not test the simplex elements. The module is however interference-free.
2. In one-out-of-three, second critical fault (1-oo-3) situations, the system remains active until the fault is detected during normal data or status reads by the MP and accessed by the application. The application then carries out a controlled plant shutdown if it is a critical input.
3. In two-out-of-three (2-oo-3) the system remains operational at all times and tolerates the single failure.

7.1.2 Effect of Output States

If the single basic state and the effect of the fault detection time are considered, then:

1. Output modules provide a two-out-of-three (2-oo-3) structure within a single module with one slice fault. A faulty output will be detected within the fault detection period, and shall be replaced within the second fault occurrence timeout period to ensure continued functional safety.

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Triguard Interface, P8161	Simplex (2003 implemented in a set of three modules)	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6.
Local Chassis Interface, MBB	Simplex (2003 implemented in a set of three modules)	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6.
Remote Slave Interface, MRB01XS	Simplex (2003 implemented in a set of three modules)	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6.
Remote Master Interface MRB04XM	Simplex (2003 implemented in a set of three modules)	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety-critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6.

Table 14 - Central Modules

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Digital Inputs MDI32BIS, TMR, 24VDC MDI32GIS, TMR, 48VDC MDI32FIS, TMR, 120VDC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4.
Digital Inputs MDI64BNS, Simplex, 24VDC	Simplex 1oo1	Normally energized (de-energize to trip). Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical input devices.
Analog Inputs MAI32(L/M)AD, TMR 0-5/10V MAI32(N/P)AD, TMR 0-20/40mA	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Within the manufactures specified safety accuracy limits. The safety state of the analogue input has to be defined to 0 mA/0 V Certified SIL 3 or AK6.

Table 15- Input Module, Triguard I/O

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Digital Outputs MDO32BNS, TMR, 24 VDC MDO16GNS, TMR, 48VDC MDO16FNS, TMR, 120VDC MDO16CNS, TMR, 120VAC	Internal 2oo3 (2oo3 implemented in a single module)	Normally energized (de-energize to trip): certified SIL 3 or AK6. Normally de-energized (energize to trip): certified only for applications that fulfil the requirements under section 3.2.4. May be used in single module or master/slave configurations.
Analogue Output MAO04NND, TMR, 0-22mA	Not safety related but interference free	Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical devices.

Table 16- Output Modules, Triguard I/O

	TÜV Certified Configuration	Conditions
Analogue Output / Pulse Input MHB44IND, TMR, 4-20mA, 1Hz-35KHz	Not safety related but interference free	Certified as non-interfering and can be used for non-safety-critical devices.

Table 17 – Triguard Multi-purpose Modules

	Conditions
Controller Chassis 8100	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6
Primary, Secondary and Remote Triguard Chassis	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6
Power Supplies PAC, PDC	Certified as safety related and can be used for safety critical applications in SIL 3 or AK6.

Table 18 – Auxiliary Chassis and PSUs

7.2 SAFETY RELATED INPUTS AND OUTPUTS

The Safety Loops, Cause and Effect Charts or other design data will define which loops are to be considered as Safety Loops. All inputs and outputs associated with Safety Loops must follow the design guidelines laid out in this section.

All Modules must be configured for 320 fail safe operation.

All output modules associated with Safety Loops must be configured with adjacent hot repair partner slots. The hot repair partners for output modules must not be fitted during normal operation.

If the process time constraint is less than 30 seconds, or only single sensors are provided for process measurement, then all input modules associated with safety loops must also be configured with adjacent hot repair partner slots.

7.2.1 Inputs

Safety inputs to a Safety System will be either Normally Energised Digital Inputs (De-Energise to Trip) or Analogue Inputs.

7.2.1.1 Digital Inputs

De-energise to trip inputs (usually termed fail-safe) will be used for all safety digital inputs. The number of safety monitoring signals required for each safety parameter will depend primarily on the safety integrity level (safety classification) required to be achieved, the 100% proof test cycle required and the level of diagnostics available from the field device.

All safety digital inputs will be wired to a Digital Input Termination Card. Where the safety integrity level requires that more than one field sensor monitoring a safety parameter, each of these sensors should be, where practical, wired to separate Termination Cards. The Simplex part of the termination card (eg fuses) must be considered for reliability analysis as part of the field loop.

The Termination Card will be connected to the Triguard SC300E Input Module via a standard system cable which connects to the socket on the appropriate Hot Repair Adapter Card (THR) or chassis slot.

Through the hot repair adapter card, where required, and the chassis backplane connector the input signal is connected to the configured digital input slot position where a Digital Input Module would be located.

All the chassis slots and, where required, its hot repair partner slots configured for the Digital Input Module must also have the polarisation keys fitted and configured for this type of module as specified in the Module and Chassis Users Manuals.

Where the safety integrity level requires that separate sensors are used to monitor the same safety parameters they should be configured to separate Digital Input Modules where practical.

7.2.1.2 Analogue Inputs

Analogue transmitters are used to monitor safety parameters and inherently provide an increased level of diagnostics with respect to a simple fail-safe digital input. Analogue signals always provide values within a set operating range. For safety related transmitters this should be 4-20mA or 1-5 volts allowing for fault indication below say 3mA (0.75V) and 20mA (5V). If over-range detection is required a 0-10V input module must be used. All monitored faults from the analogue signals must be used by the application software to produce fail-safe results (eg failed transmitter demands a shutdown).

The number of analogue transmitters used to monitor a safety parameter will be dependent on the system integrity level (safety classification) requirement of the loop, the 100% proof test cycle of the loop and the level of diagnostics available from the transmitter.

The field analogue signal is wired to the Analogue Input Termination Card. Where the safety integrity levels require that more than one transmitter be used to monitor a safety parameter, then the additional analogue input signals should be wired to separate Termination Cards where practical. The Simplex circuitry on the termination card must be considered for reliability as part of the transmitter loop (eg fuses and monitoring resistors where fitted). Refer to Figure 7.

The signal is connected from the termination card to the Triguard SC300E input module via a standard system cable, which connects to the socket on the appropriate Hot Repair Adapter Card (THR) or chassis connector.

Through the Hot Repair Adapter Card, where required, and the chassis backplane connector the input signal is connected to the appropriate configured analogue input module slot position, where an appropriate Analogue Input Module would be located.

All the chassis slot and, where required, their hot repair partner slots configured for the Analogue module must also have the polarisation keys fitted and configured for this type of module as specified in the Module and Chassis User Manuals.




Figure 7 - Current to Voltage Conversion

Where separate transmitters are used to monitor the same safety parameters to meet increased integrity levels these should be configured to separate Analogue Input Modules where practical.

Switch inputs with end of line and series line-monitoring resistors fitted may be connected as analogue inputs. These line-monitored inputs provide increased diagnostic information to the safety system giving discrete analogue values (step changes) for open circuit, switch open, switch closed and short circuit conditions.

7.2.1.3 Fail Safe Analogue Processing

For each Analogue Input variable received by the system, three values are generated, one from each channel. Under normal operation (transparent to the application) a standard mid-value selection algorithm is used selecting the middle value (assuming all three values are within the health window) to be passed on to the application. It is this mid-value that the user operates on within the application, all three processing channels now using this selected mid-value.

When one of the three analogue channel values presented to the processors falls outside of the health window the processors flag it as bad by converting it to a negative number. If now the two remaining values diverge by more than the health window these are also flagged as bad by converting them to negative numbers. The effect is to present to the application a negative value when 2 or more channels are bad.

The application, by use of either an analogue processing module or simple comparators, can provide a bad/safe discrete for each analogue value.

When large numbers of Analogue Inputs are to be processed, a function should be used to effectively monitor faults within the analogue loops.

This configuration provides for each analogue variable an array of discrettes for channel faults, open and short circuit faults, as well as defining a global fault bit and the test parameters. Both open and short circuit faults values should be configured.

7.2.2 Outputs

The standard configuration for ESD Safety System outputs is to provide digital outputs only, which are configured for de-energise to trip (again fail to safe).

7.2.2.1 De-Energise to Trip Outputs

All safety related outputs will be from the Digital Output Module. Each module must be configured with a hot repair partner slot to allow bumpless hot repair to be accomplished.

The Output Module provides a fully tested six-element switch voting circuit for each individual output.

Where the safety integrity level (safety classification) requirements of a safety loop requires two or more final elements to be available for shutdown purpose, then each final elements should be driven from a separate Digital Output Module and Termination Card, where practical.

The shutdown signal is connected from the Output Module through the chassis backplane, the hot repair adapter card and the system cable to the Termination Card where the field wiring is connected.

The simplex part of the termination module (e.g. fuses) must be considered as part of the field loop for reliability analysis.

7.2.2.2 Multiple Input / Output Safety Configuration

Where the safety integrity level requires multiple sensors and final elements from a safety loop, then these configurations will be as follows.

7.2.2.3 Dual Sensors

These will be voted by the application logic in a 1oo2 manner such that either sensor providing an alarm status requires a shutdown.

Where the sensor diagnostics provide fault status then the safety loop may revert to a 1oo1 voting on the good sensor for the time constraint of the sensor's safety loop. At the termination of this time constraint the loop will demand a shutdown.

A single remaining sensor going into fault will demand an immediate shutdown.

7.2.2.4 Triplicated Sensors

These will be voted on a 2oo3 basis by the application logic; however, once a sensor has been voted as bad, the voting logic will revert to a 1oo2 vote on the remaining two sensors following the strategy determined for dual sensors.

7.2.2.5 Dual Final Elements

These are to be configured in a 1oo2 manner such that either output requires a shutdown.

7.2.2.6 Hot Repair Adapters

Wherever dual slot hot repair facilities are required, the hot repair adapter boards must be fitted on the chassis backplane.

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